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Brief of Respondent 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Defendant Snyderville West (hereinafter " Snyderville 
West") does not contest Plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction in 
this Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter, 
including where appropriate her predecessor in this case, 
"Plaintiff" ) from: 
(a) An interlocutory Order of the Third District Court, 
Summit County, entered November 15, 1988, setting aside 
(1) An August 28, 1985 default judgment, and 
(2) A January 17, 1986, final Judgment as to 
Snyderville West; and 
(b) A final Order of the same Court entered July 5, 1989, 
dismissing the action as to Snyderville West. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting Snyderville West' s 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, where defendant Snyderville 
West was not personally served, where its address was known to 
counsel for Plaintiff but no attempt at service was made, and 
where the only proof of mailing of summons shows that the summons 
was mailed to the wrong address? 
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2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Complaint 
against Snyderville West in not giving any grounds for dismissal 
beyond making reference to the memoranda? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Rules, cited in this Brief, are determinative 
of the issues on appeal: 
Rule 4(b), U. R. C. P. 
Rule 4(c), U. R. C. P. 
Rule 4(f), U. R. C. P. 
Rule 12(b), U. R. C. P. 
Rule 52, U. R. C. P. 
Rule 60, U. R. C. P. 
Rule 60(b) (5), U. R. C. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a quiet title action to real property located 
in Summit County, Utah. 
JL ChrgnplQgy Qf Relevant F^pt? 
I. Purchase of the Subject Property by Snyderville West, 
1. Snyderville West purchased the subject property 
from Investor Associates by Uniform Real Estate Contract (the 
"Contract") dated July 13, 1978. (R. 0602). The Contract 
covered two parcels of property, an 8-acre parcel not in issue in 
this case, and a 7-acre parcel (the subject property). (R. 0599) 
2. In accordance with the Contract, title to the 8-
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acre parcel was released and conveyed to Snyderville West at the 
time of execution of the Contract, and title thereto is not an 
issue herein. The 7-acre parcel was purchased under the Contract 
for a total purchase price of $120,000.00, of which $20,000.00 
was paid on execution, and the balance was to be paid in semi-
annual installments until July 1, 1983 when the entire remaining 
balance of principal and interest was to become due and payable. 
(R. 0599). 
3. Robert W. Major, Jr. (a. k. a. R. W. Major, a. k. a. 
Robert W. Major) ("Major") executed the Contract for and on 
behalf of the seller Investor Associates. (R. 0599; R. 0603). 
Major is the decedent of the Estate of Major in this case. 
4. Reese S. Howell, of Title Insurance Agency 
("Howell") witnessed the execution of the Contract. (R. 0603; R. 
0626). 
5. Major executed a Notice of Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (the "Notice of Contract") in favor of Snyderville West, 
the Buyer, dated July 14, 1978, as agent ("Chairman") of 
Investor Associates (R. 0609; R. 0599). Howell notarized on 
July 13, 1978 the signature of Major on the Notice of Contract. 
6. Following execution of the Contract, Snyderville 
West took possession of the subject property, paid the property 
taxes, and made all payments of principal and interest called for 
under the Contract in a substantially timely manner. (R. 0599). 
7. Major died March 20, 1980. (R. 0021, paragraph 
1). 
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8. At the time of Major's death in 1980, neither 
Investor Associates nor Major owned the subject property. (R. 
0626; R. 0627) 
9. Howell7 s office of Title Insurance Agency after 
execution of the Contract in 1978 acted as a collection agent for 
Snyderville West and the Seller, Investor Associates and 
subsequently Joseph L. Krofcheck, until the Contract was paid in 
full in mid-1983. (R. 0627). 
10. On or about July 20, 1983, Snyderville West made 
the final payment as called for under the Contract. Snyderville 
West made its payment by check #150, payable to Title Insurance 
Agency in the amount of $32,210.10. (R. 0599). 
11. Thereafter, Snyderville West obtained and recorded 
a Warranty Deed which was acknowledged October 26, 1983, recorded 
January 19, 1984 as Entry No. 215912 in the Summit County 
Records. (R. 0600; R. 0611; R. 0627). 
12. There is no document of record affecting the 
subject property which at any time in the past vested or 
purported to vest in the decedent in this case, Major, any right, 
title or interest in or to the subject property. (R. 0627). 
13. Snyderville West' s address at all times relevant 
to this case (and to the present time) was 1253 East 2100 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, which address was also Snyderville 
West's "tax notice address" in 1983. (R. 0274, R. 0279; R. 0600; 
R. 0992; R. 0995; R. 1030; pp. 38-39; R. 1031, pp. 13-14). 
14. Snyderville West continued to pay the property 
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taxes on the subject property until 1987, when (on or about 
October 22, 1987) Gaddis was informed for the first time that 
Snyderville West was no longer the owner of record as to the 
subject property, but that Snyderville West had been divested of 
fee title ownership through a court order entered in this case. 
(R. 0600). 
II. Plaintiff's Lawsuit (see also Section C, " gpyrge pf 
Processings, " infrgt) 
15. The Complaint in this case was filed by Plaintiff 
as Personal Representative of the deceased, Major, on April 6, 
1983. (R. 0001). 
16. No Summons and Complaint were ever personally 
served on Snyderville West, until March 27, 1989. (R. 0992). 
17. The Summons which was served upon Gaddis on May 
11, 1983 made no reference to service upon Snyderville West. (R. 
0050). 
18. At no time prior to 1987 did Plaintiff ever make 
any inquiries with Gaddis nor anyone else at the 1253 East 2100 
South address of Snyderville West as to the whereabouts of 
Snyderville West. (R. 0600). 
III. Plaintiff7 s Knowledge of Snyderville West' s Interest in 
the Subject Property and its Address. 
19. Plaintiff through her counsel in this case 
received in June, 1982 a Commitment for Title Insurance (the 
"1982 Title Report") which covered the subject property 
(described as "Parcel No. 6" or "Parcel 6") and which showed as 
Exception No. 53 that Snyderville West was the grantor in 1981 of 
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an easement across the subject property, and which showed as 
Exception No. 83 that Snyderville West, by reason of a "Notice of 
Uniform Real Estate Contract" dated July 13, 1978 and recorded 
July 14, 1978, claimed an interest in the subject property by 
reason of an unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R. 1030, 
pp. 60-68, Exhibit 23 thereto). A copy of relevant pages of the 
1982 Title Report is attached hereto as Addendum C. This is a 
true copy of said pages of Exhibit 23 to the Davis deposition 
transcript (R. 1030). The front page (R. 1030) of the deposition 
transcript has a notation as follows: "Exhibits to be given to 
Judge on 8-2-88 in S. L. " but Snyderville West has not been 
provided with a copy of the exhibits as part of the trial record. 
20. Plaintiff was aware of Snyderville West7 s tax 
address, 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 by no 
later than October, 1983. (R. 0644-0652; R. 1030, pp. 39 and 
58). 
IV. Plaintiff7 s Attempt to Serve Snyderville West by Mail. 
(See also Section C. "Course of Proceedings," infra) 
21. The Affidavit of Mailing which was prepared by the 
attorneys for Plaintiff for use by the Clerk of the Court in 
connection with the mailing of Summons7 to certain Defendants in 
connection with Plaintiff's attempt to obtain default judgments 
against said Defendants, including Snyderville West, was signed, 
subscribed and sworn to by the Clerk of the Court on December 19, 
1983, and was filed on December 19, 1983. (R. 0300). In 
pertinent part, as to Snyderville West, the Affidavit states as 
follows: 
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4. The undersigned [Clerk of the Court] mailed a 
true and correct copy of said Summons to each of 
the Defendants listed below at their respective 
addresses by addressing and dispatching a copy of 
said Summons and a copy of said Complaint, postage 
prepaid: 
e. Snyderville West, 1253 East 
7100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84106 (tax notice address);... (R. 
0301). [emphasis added] 
Said Affidavit is the only definite evidence before the Court as 
to the address to which the Summons and Complaint were mailed to 
Snyderville West. Said address is in error, in that Snyderville 
West7 s true address at all times relevant hereto was 1253 East 
2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 (see paragraph 13 above). 
22. The attorney for Plaintiff responsible for 
personal service of process and service by publication and 
mailing on the Defendants in this case, T. Richard Davis 
("Davis"), (R. 1030, p. 13), does not specifically remember the 
envelope addressed to Snyderville West which was mailed by the 
Clerk, as described in paragraph 21 above (R. 1030, p. 54), nor 
does Davis have an independent recollection nor does Plaintiff 
have other evidence of what address was on the envelope (R. 1030, 
pp. 89-90), nor was Davis able to state definitely that such an 
envelope was never returned to Plaintiff s attorneys (R. 1030, 
pp. 54-55). 
23. According to Davis, Plaintiff s attorneys did not 
themselves put all of the necessary postage on the envelopes 
referred to in paragraph 22 above which were mailed to the 
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Defendants (including Snyderville West) (R. 1030, p. 90), and 
Davis cannot state with a certainty that the envelope addressed 
to Snyderville West was mailed out with the correct postage (R. 
1030, p. 92). 
24. According to William Frank Nebeker ("Nebeker"), 
Carrier Supervisor for the United States Postal Service in 1983, 
since the United States Postal Service does not keep any delivery 
records on regular first-class mail, Nebeker cannot say for 
certain that the envelope addressed to Snyderville West as 
referred to in paragraph 22 above was returned to the sender, 
delivered to the addressee, or misdelivered by the carrier 
(Affidavit No. 2 of William Frank Nebeker, R. 0714-0715). 
25. Neither Snyderville West nor Gaddis on behalf of 
Snyderville West ever received, to the knowledge or recollection 
of Gaddis, a copy of the Summons and Complaint in this case by 
mail. (R. 0600; R. 1031 at pp. 44-45; R. 0736-0737). 
V. Settlement Discussions by Others. 
26. Attorney Don R. Strong ("Strong") represented a 
number of Defendants in this case, including inter alia Gaddis 
personally, but at no time from the filing of the Complaint in 
this case through to the time of execution of his Affidavit in 
July, 1988 had he or did he represent Snyderville West. (R. 
0973-0974). 
27. Strong personally participated in the settlement 
discussions held between and involving Plaintiff and a number of 
the Defendants, which settlement discussions led to execution by 
. - 8 -
himself on behalf of certain Defendants (not including 
Snyderville West), of that certain Stipulation for Settlement 
dated October 2, 1985, and filed January 17, 1986 (R. 0479; 
R. 0973-0974). 
28. Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck (" Krof check" ), one of the 
Defendants in this case, personally participated in the 
settlement discussions involving the attorney for Plaintiff, 
Strong and others, which settlement discussions led to execution 
by himself and certain other parties of that same Stipulation for 
Settlement referred to in paragraph 28 above. (R. 0967-0968). 
29. The understanding of both Krofcheck and Strong 
during said settlement negotiations was that the subject 
property, having been sold prior to commencement of the lawsuit 
and thereafter deeded away, was not a part of the settlement 
discussions. (R. 0968-0969; R. 0974-0975). 
C* Course gf Proceedings 
1. On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major, then Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased, 
filed a complaint (the "Complaint") to quiet title to eleven (11) 
parcels of real property located in Summit County, Utah, 
including inter alia as "Parcel No. 6" (R. 0016) the property 
then owned and held by Snyderville West, which property is the 
subject of this appeal (the "subject property"). (R. 0001). 
2. The Summons' filed May 13, 1983 named many defendants, 
including Snyderville West and Jim Gaddis, an individual, a. k. a. 
James R. Gaddis, ("Gaddis"). (R. 0022, et al. ). 
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3. The Summons and Complaint were served May 11, 1983 upon 
Gaddis, personally. (R. 0050). 
4. An Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Order 
Permitting Service by Publication was filed on October 17, 1983 
(R. 0273). The Affidavit listed Snyderville West's "last known 
address" as 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, 
which address was further stated to be Snyderville West's "tax 
notice address." (R, 0274). 
5. A Motion for Order Permitting Service of Summons by 
Publication for Snyderville West, among other defendants, was 
filed October 17, 1983. (R. 0264). The Order directed service 
of process on the listed defendants, including Snyderville West, 
by publication and, as to Snyderville West, by mailing a copy of 
the Summons and Complaint to Snyderville West at its "last known 
address", which was stated to be 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106 ("tax notice address"). (R. 0279). 
6. A Summons, dated December 7, 1983, was issued wherein 
certain defendants, including Snyderville West, were named as 
defendants to be served by publication. (R. 0283). 
7. A Default Certificate was filed August 12, 1985 stating 
that all defendants served by publication had failed to appear 
and answer Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 0432). 
8. A judgment by default was filed August 29, 1985 and 
pursuant to that judgment, all of the named defendants, including 
Snyderville West, were defaulted and determined to have no 
interest in the property. (R. 0444). 
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9. On January 17, 1986, final Judgment against Snyderville 
West, among other defendants, was filed. (R. 0552). 
10. On August 1, 1988, following discovery and submission 
of memoranda and affidavits by Snyderville West and Plaintiff, 
the Court (the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge) heard 
arguments on Snyderville West' s Motion to set Aside Default 
Judgment and made its Minute Entry (R. 0978). 
11. On September 8, 1988, the Court issued its Minute 
Entry, which was filed on September 9, 1988. (R. 0979). 
12. On November 10, 1988, the Court issued its Order, which 
was filed November 15, 1988, setting aside the default judgment 
as to Snyderville West which was filed on August 29, 1985 (R. 
0444) and the final Judgment as to Snyderville West which was 
filed on January 17, 1986 (R. 0552). (R. 0986). 
13. In 1989, Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint were served 
on Snyderville West at its address, 1253 East 2100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84106, as shown by an Affidavit of Service. (R. 
0995). The Affidavit of Service indicates that "Jim Gaddis, 
general partner" accepted service. 
14. On May 12, 1989, Snyderville West filed its Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis that there has been non-compliance with Rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for the reason that 
the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against Snyderville West. (R. 0996). 
15. On June 5, 1989, the Court (the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge) filed its Minute Entry, in which the Court 
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granted Snyderville West's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 1019). 
16. On July 5, 1989, the Court filed its Order dismissing 
the Complaint against Snyderville West. (R. 1020). 
17. On July 31, 1989, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, 
appealing the final Order dismissing the action against 
Snyderville West entered July 5, 1989, and the Interlocutory 
Order vacating and setting aside the Judgments against 
Snyderville West entered November 15, 1988. (R. 1023). 
D. Disposition in the Lower Court 
1. Pursuant to Minute Entry entered September 9, 1988, 
(R. 0979), the trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
Judge, by Order dated November 15, 1988, (R. 0986), set aside the 
default judgment filed against Snyderville West August 29, 1985 
(R. 0444) and the final Judgment filed January 17, 1986 (R. 
0552). 
2. On July 5, 1989, the trial court, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick, Judge, dismissed the Complaint against 
Snyderville West. (R, 1020). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case on appeal comes down to the following issue: 
given that Plaintiff had the correct address of Snyderville West, 
but failed to attempt personal service of Snyderville West at 
that address, and instead attempted service by mail, but used the 
incorrect address, is Plaintiff nonetheless entitled to have a 
default judgment against Snyderville West? 
The trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
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Judge, concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to have default 
judgment. In his words, " [n]o adequate explanation has been 
given for what appears to be a failure to personally serve 
Snyderville West at its known tax notice address. . ..The mistake 
that apparently occurred must be corrected and Rule 60 is the 
vehicle. The court is persuaded that service of process upon 
Snyderville West was invalid and the subsequent judgment is thus 
void as to Snyderville West. " Minute Entry, dated September 8, 
1988 (R. 0979-R. 0980). 
It is undisputed that Snyderville West, entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to purchase the subject property in 
1978 from Investor Associates. Major signed the Contract as 
agent for Investor Associates. The subject property was paid 
off and Snyderville West' s Warranty Deed placed of record in 
1983, before entry of the default judgment. 
This lawsuit was commenced in April, 1983. The record 
discloses that Plaintiff knew of the interest of Snyderville West 
in the subject property. Plaintiff knew the address at which 
Snyderville West received its tax notices (its "tax address"), 
which was Snyderville West' s actual address and principal place 
of business. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not in fact serve 
Snyderville West. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not 
attempt to serve Snyderville West of its address. It is likewise 
undisputed that Plaintiff did not intend to serve Snyderville 
West, when it served defendant Jim Gaddis. Among other things, 
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Plaintiff s attorney Davis in his Motion and Affidavit in 1983 
represented to the court that Plaintiff was unable to serve 
Snyderville West. Plaintiff could have served Snyderville West at 
its actual address, if she had tried to. But Plaintiff did not 
try to. 
Notwithstanding the attempts of Plaintiff to show 
otherwise in Plaintiff s Brief of Appellant, service on the 
defendant Jim Gaddis is not the same as service on the defendant 
Snyderville West. Gaddis was served individually, in his 
individual capacity, as a defendant separate and apart from 
Snyderville West. 
Although Plaintiff is her Brief suggests otherwise, 
there is no evidence or testimony in the record that indicates 
that Snyderville West had attempted to keep its identity or its 
property ownership a secret. Snyderville West put its Notice of 
purchase of the subject property of record in 1978, and took 
title to the subject property and recorded its Warranty Deed in 
1983. Snyderville West was listed on the tax rolls of Summit 
County as the owner of the subject property, from which records 
Plaintiff in fact obtained Snyderville West' s true address. 
Contrary to the arguments of Plaintiff, Utah law 
requires "due diligence" on the part of a Plaintiff to effect 
personal service of process. 
Substitute service by publication and mailing was not 
effective, when by application of the most rudimentary levels of 
diligence the defendant Snyderville West could have been served 
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at its address. 
But in any event, the record shows that service of 
process was mailed to the wrong address. 
The remaining issue on this appeal is that because the 
trial court dismissed the Complaint without elaborating on the 
grounds for dismissal, beyond reference to the memoranda of the 
parties, the dismissal must be set aside. But the record amply 
supports either of Snyderville West' s two stated grounds for 
dismissal. But even if the trial court should have stated the 
grounds for dismissal as a condition precedent to an effective 
dismissal, the trial court should be given the opportunity to set 
forth the grounds for dismissal. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE JUDGMENTS OF THE LOWER 
COURT IN SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT TAKEN AGAINST SNYDERVILLE 
WEST, AND LATER IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AGAINST 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, IN THE ABSENCE OF 
CLEAR ERROR MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
Snyderville West moved the Court pursuant to Rule 60 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an Order Setting Aside the 
Default Judgment entered against Snyderville West. The bases for 
Snyderville West's motion were that (i) invalid service of 
process renders the default judgment void pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(5), (ii) that time limitations under Rule 60(b) as to when 
relief must be sought have no application where service of 
process is invalid and the judgment is void, and (iii) that 
Snyderville West has a meritorious defense to the action. 
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For defendants whose whereabouts are known or who can be readily 
found, personal service is required rather than constructive 
service by publication. The United States Supreme Court in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) 
supported this finding by reasoning: 
It would be idle to pretend that 
publication alone. .. is a reliable 
means of acquainting interested 
parties of the fact that their 
rights are before the courts... 
chance alone brings to the 
attention of even a local resident 
an advertisement in small type 
inserted in the back pages of a 
newspaper, and if he makes his home 
outside the areas of the 
newspaper' s normal circulation the 
odds that the information will 
never reach him are large 
i n d e e d . ..in w e i g h i n g its 
sufficiency on the basis of 
equivalence of actual notice, we 
are unable to regard this as more 
than feint. Id. at 315. 
The preference for personal service over service by publication 
is reflected both in the statute which governs notice by 
publication and in case law. Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that service by publication may be used 
only after plaintiff has filed a verified motion and supporting 
affidavit stating facts authorizing such service and showing "the 
efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within 
this state." The court must be "satisfied that due diligence has 
been used to obtain personal service within this state" or that 
the efforts to obtain personal service would be futile, before an 
order for publication is granted. The Utah Supreme Court has 
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written: 
A Summons must be served upon a 
defendant personally if he be 
within the confines of the State 
and not in hiding. If he be 
without the State or so conceals 
himself within the State that 
personal service cannot be had upon 
him, then jurisdiction is 
obtained...by publishing the 
summons in a newspaper. . . [emphasis 
added]. 
Lloyd v Third Judicial District Court in and For Salt Lake 
County, 495 P. 2d 1262, 1262-63 (Utah 1972). 
The Affidavit filed by Plaintiff in this case (R. 0273) 
was insufficient to justify an order allowing service by 
publication with respect to Snyderville West. Plaintiff s 
Affidavit merely recited the statutory language of Rule 4(f) 
stating that after exercising "due diligence" in locating the 
current addresses of the Defendants, Plaintiff was: 
Informed and believes that each of 
the defendants listed above 
[including Snyderville West] either 
resides outside the State of Utah, 
has departed from the State of 
Utah, has concealed himself to 
avoid service of process, cannot 
after due diligence be found within 
the State, and/or is a corporation 
having no officer or agent upon 
whom process can be served, 
(emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has written: 
Concerning the s u f f i c i e n c y of 
p l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t of ju r i sd ic t iona l facts: we recognize 
t h a t such an a f f i d a v i t i s not 
s u f f i c i e n t i f i t s t a t e s mere 
conclusions as to d i l igent search 
and inquiry. I t must set forth 
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j udgment void. 
Generally, service of process must 
be substantially in accordance with 
the requirements of the law; if 
service is insufficient and 
unauthorized by law, the court does 
not acquire jurisdiction and the 
judgment rendered is without 
validity, force or effect. 62 Am 
Jur 2d "Process", §30. 
IV. THE MAY 18, 1984 PURPORTED 
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION UPON 
SNYDERVILLE WEST WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUBJECT SNYDERVILLE WEST TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
A. Failure of Plaintiff to Exercise "Due Diligence". 
Rule 4(f) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires as 
a condition precedent to the use of "other service" (service by 
publication and service by mailing a copy of the summons and 
complaint), that the movant shall have exercised "due diligence" 
in attempting to personally serve a defendant who could be found 
in the State. Rule 4(f)(1). In this case, the testimony of 
Plaintiff's attorney demonstrates that, far from exercising "due 
diligence" Plaintiff did nothing to follow up on its "tax 
address" information for Snyderville West, nor did it pursue 
information from the title documents of record which identified 
and disclosed Snyderville West's interest in the subject 
property. 
The address which Plaintiff s Affidavit lists as 
Snyderville West's "last known address", 1253 East 2100 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, was in fact Snyderville West's 
address. This address was not a bogus one. In fact, Plaintiff 
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was able to serve Gaddis personally at that very address. Yet, 
Plaintiff (to the best knowledge of Gaddis) never made any 
inquiries with Gaddis or anyone else at the 1253 East 2100 South 
location with respect to the whereabouts of Snyderville West. 
Further, Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Major, 
executed documents (the Contract and the Notice of Contract) 
which designated Snyderville West as the Buyer of the Snyderville 
West property, gave an address and telephone number for 
Snyderville West, and identified Gaddis as a principal person 
connected with Snyderville West. These same documents identified 
Reese Howell and Title Insurance Agency as being involved in the 
purchase transaction. Any of these persons or entities could 
through an inquiry have directed Plaintiff to Snyderville West 
for the purpose of personal service of process. Presumptively, 
as successor to the deceased Major, Plaintiff had (or should have 
had) access to these documents. Plaintiff s failure to act on 
these sources of information, for whatever reason, hardly 
constitutes "due diligence11 on the part of Plaintiff. 
According to the testimony of Plaintiff7 s lawyer, at 
some time before June, 1982, Plaintiff s attorney searched the 
Summit County records, and, based on this search, Plaintiff s 
attorneys identified the legal description of Parcel No. 6 of the 
Complaint (the subject property), which at that time was held at 
record in the name of Joseph L. Krofcheck. Then Plaintiff 
obtained a Commitment for Title Insurance, S-5383 with an 
effective date of June 10, 1982 (Davis deposition, R. 1030, 
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Exhibit No. 23) (the "1982 Title Report"). The 1982 Title Report 
disclosed the name of Snyderville West as having an interest in 
Parcel No. 6 of the Complaint (also Parcel No. 6 of the 1982 
Title Report), as disclosed in paragraphs 53 and 83 ("Special 
Exceptions" of Schedule B - Section 2) thereof. Thereupon 
Plaintiff s attorneys went to the Summit County Assessor' s Office 
and obtained the tax address of Snyderville West, being 1253 East 
2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. Exactly when Plaintiffs 
attorneys obtained such address is not clear, but it was between 
May, 1983 and October 14, 1983, or in other words, before 
Plaintiff moved to serve Defendant Snyderville West by 
publication. (Davis deposition, R. 1030, pp. 22, 23, 28, 35-39, 
58, 59, 65). 
Thus, Plaintiff s counsel had actual knowledge that 
Snyderville West claimed an interest in Parcel No. 6, as a 
purchaser on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
The testimony of Plaintiff s attorney Davis, is that at 
this point Plaintiff did nothing further to attempt to find out 
information concerning the identity and whereabouts of 
Snyderville West, or indeed to ascertain whether Snyderville West 
could be served personally at 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106. The record of what Plaintiff could have done, 
and failed to do, establishes clearly that Plaintiff failed in 
its requirement to exercise due diligence. 
B, Snyderville West Did Not Conceal Itself to Avoid 
the Service of Process. 
Rule 4(f)(1) provides that where a person upon whom 
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service is sought "conceals himself to avoid the service of 
process," service of process may be made by publication. 
Plaintiff has suggested in her Brief of Appellant that 
Snyderville West has "concealed itself." 
The facts of this case, as set forth supra, refute this 
suggestion. As discussed more fully above, since 1978 
Snyderville West' s identity was a matter of public record in the 
Summit County Recorder' s Office. Snyderville West gave notice of 
its contract purchase interest when it first purchased the 
subject property in 1978, and when Snyderville West took title by 
Warranty Deed in 1983, it recorded the Warranty Deed. From and 
after 1978, Snyderville West paid taxes on the subject property, 
and its name and address were a matter of public record. Its 
"tax notice address" was in fact its actual address. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Snyderville West 
"concealed itself" or "hid" to avoid the service of process. 
Plaintiff s suggestions in her Brief of Appellant that 
Snyderville West was "hiding" (Brief of Appellant at 49), or that 
"Snyderville West played hide and seek" (Brief of Appellant at 
37) are totally unsupported by the record, and in light of the 
facts in this case, when it was Plaintiff which brought suit and 
pursued default judgment against Snyderville West without any 
basis for the lawsuit, are simply outrageous. 
C. The Summons and Complaint Directed at Snyderville 
West Were Mailed to an Incorrect Address. 
An additional requirement of Rule 4(f) with respect to 
service by publication is that "within ten days after the order 
- 27 -
is entered, the Clerk shall mail a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint to each person whose address has been stated in the 
motion. '• Although the Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff' s Motion 
for Order Permitting Service by Publication stated Snyderville 
West's last known address as 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106, the Affidavit of Mailing filed by the Clerk of 
the Court certifying that the Summons and Complaint were mailed 
lists the mailing address for Snyderville West as 1253 East 7100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
The only definite evidence before the Court in this 
Appeal as to the actual address to which the Summons and 
Complaint were mailed is the Affidavit of Mailing filed by the 
Clerk of the Court, which certified that the envelope containing 
the Summons and Complaint directed to Snyderville West was sent 
to the incorrect address. Plaintiff has gamely attempted to 
suggest that this was a mere mistake in the Affidavit of Mailing, 
but the fact remains that Plaintiff s attorneys prepared the 
Affidavit of Mailing as well as the envelopes addressed to the 
several Defendants, including Snyderville West, and the 
Affidavit, as subscribed and sworn to by the Clerk, gives an 
address that is not Snyderville West' s true address. 
As set forth more fully in the Chronology of Relevant 
Facts supra. Plaintiff's attorneys are unable to state 
conclusively that the envelope directed at Snyderville West was 
in fact sent to Snyderville West' s correct address. Nor is there 
any unequivocable evidence from the United States Post Office as 
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to where the Snyderville West envelope was sent. 
There is no definite evidence that Gaddis or anyone 
else on behalf of Snyderville West received the Summons and 
Complaint which was mailed to Snyderville West. The Affidavit 
and deposition testimony of Gaddis are that neither he nor anyone 
in his office have any record of receiving the Summons and 
Complaint by mail, nor does Gaddis recall ever receiving such an 
envelope. Presumptively, based on the evidence properly before 
this Court on appeal, the requirements for mailing the Summons 
and Complaint as set forth and required by Rule 4(f) were not 
satisfied, and therefore there was no effective service by 
publication pursuant to Rule 4(f). 
D. The Distinction Attempted by Plaintiff Between In 
Personam and In Rem is not Valid Nor is it 
Relevant to This Case. 
The distinction attempted by Plaintiff in her Brief of 
Appellant between in personam and in rem is not valid nor is it 
relevant to this case. The Mullane case discussed supra makes 
this clear. As stated in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983): 
The d e c i s i o n in Mullane r e j e c t e d 
one of the premises under lying t h i s 
c o u r t ' s p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of 
n o t i c e i n j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s : 
t h a t due process r i g h t s may vary 
depending on whether ac t ions are in 
rem or in personam. 
Beginning with Mullane. t h i s Court 
has recognized , c o n t r a r y t o t h e 
e a r l i e r l i n e of cases , t h a t "an 
adverse judgment in rem d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t s t h e p r o p e r t y owner by 
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divesting him of his rights in the 
property before the Court," 
[citation omitted]. In rejecting 
the traditional justification for 
distinguishing between residents 
and non residents and between in 
rem and in personam actions, the 
Court has not left all interested 
claimants to the vagaries of 
indirect notice. Our cases have 
required the state to make efforts 
to provide actual notice to all 
interested parties comparable to 
the efforts that were previously 
required only in in personam 
actions, (at 796, N. 3 ). 
Further, an examination of the pleadings in light of 
the information available to Plaintiff and the other facts of 
this case indicate that this is not properly an in rem action in 
any event. The information available to Plaintiff before 
commencement of her lawsuit, as supported by the Chronology of 
Relevant Facts supra, reveal that as to Snyderville West 
Plaintiff only had ai most a seller7 s claim under the 1978 
Uniform Real Estate Contract by Investor Associates in favor of 
Snyderville West. Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
existence of this Contract, through her actual knowledge of a 
recorded Notice of Contract, as shown in the 1982 
Title Report (in "Special Exceptions" No. 83) which Plaintiff 
obtained and reviewed prior to commencing this lawsuit in 1983 
(R. 1030, pp. 15-17, 61-62, 65-67, 73). Further, Plaintiff had 
constructive notice through the recording of the Notice of 
Contract in 1978. 
Plaintiff has failed in her Complaint to allege a 
breach of contract, and the Complaint in fact fails to state a 
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cause of action against Snyderville West. Under Utah law, the 
seller of real estate does not have an interest in land, but only 
the seller' s right under a contract, which is a personal right. 
Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 1987). As stated by the 
Court in Butler (at 1255): 
T h e d o c t r i n e o f e q u i t a b l e 
c o n v e r s i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e 
s e l l e r ' s i n t e r e s t a s a n i n t e r e s t i n 
p e r s o n a l t y a n d n o t a s o n e i n 
r e a l t y , w h e r e a s t h e v e n d e e ' s 
i n t e r e s t u n d e r t h e e x e c u t o r y 
c o n t r a c t i s deemed a n i n t e r e s t i n 
r e a l t y . . . . The v e n d o r ' s r e t e n t i o n 
o f t h e l e g a l t i t l e i s u s u a l l y 
c o u p l e d w i t h a c o n t r a c t r i g h t t o 
f o r f e i t t h e v e n d e e ' s i n t e r e s t a n d 
t o t a k e b a c k t h e v e n d e e ' s i n t e r e s t s 
i f t h e v e n d e e d e f a u l t s . 
T h e v e n d o r ' s i n t e r e s t i s 
s i m i l a r t o t h e s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t o f 
a p u r c h a s e money m o r t g a g e e . 
V. THE JANUARY 12, 1986 JUDGMENT 
ENTERED UPON THE STIPULATION FOR 
SETTLEMENT SIGNED BY ATTORNEY 
STRONG (WHO REPRESENTED, INTER 
ALIA. GADDIS PERSONALLY) DID NOT 
BIND SNYDERVILLE WEST. 
P l a i n t i f f i n h e r a rgumen t s b e f o r e t h e l ower c o u r t 
c l a imed t h a t because Gaddis was r e p r e s e n t e d ( a l o n g w i t h many 
o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s ) by a t t o r n e y S t rong , and t h a t b e c a u s e Gaddis 
c l a imed an i n t e r e s t i n P a r c e l No. 6 ( t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y ) on ly 
t h r o u g h S n y d e r v i l l e West, t h a t somehow t h i s e q u a t e s t o " a c t u a l 
n o t i c e " f o r p u r p o s e s of s a t i s f y i n g l e g a l s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of S n y d e r v i l l e West. 
- 31 -
However, Strong had no knowledge of Snyderville West 
(R. 1030/ pp. 46, 85), and Strong did not represent Snyderville 
West in this case (R. 0974; R. 1030, p. 46). Further, title to 
Parcel No. 6 was never discussed in the settlement negotiations, 
and at least in the eyes of defendant Joseph L. Krofcheck and 
attorney Don Strong there was never an intent that good title of 
value to Parcel 6 specifically was on the table or would devolve 
to Plaintiff (Strong Affidavits, R. 0710 - 0711 paragraphs 5-9, 
R. 0974 - 0975, paragraph 6; Krofcheck Affidavits, R. 0706-
0707, paragraph 4-7, R. 0968 - 0969, paragraphs 4 - 8 ) . 
Beyond the foregoing, mere "actual notice" of an action 
is not sufficient, in the absence of proper service of process. 
See Murdock, supra: see also, e.g., Park, supra. 
Plaintiff now for purposes of this appeal has recast 
her "actual notice" argument into an argument that Snyderville 
West, as "an undisclosed principal" is "bound by contracts and 
conveyances made on his account by an agent acting within his 
authority..." (Brief of Appellant, at 40). 
Plaintiff did not raise this argument in the lower 
court, and is now precluded from making this argument on appeal. 
There is no basis for this argument anyway. But, if Plaintiff 
had felt that her "undisclosed principal" argument was worthy of 
advancement, she should have advanced this argument before the 
lower court. An argument not made before the trial court may not 
be heard on appeal. 
First of all, Snyderville West was not, and cannot be 
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considered to have been, an "undisclosed principal." Plaintiff 
determined whom she wished to sue, and she sued Snyderville West 
as well as Gaddis. Plaintiff had actual knowledge of Snyderville 
West's claim to ownership of the subject property prior to 
commencing the lawsuit in 1983, through the 1982 Title Report. 
Snyderville West was not "undisclosed" to Plaintiff, and so 
Plaintiff s argument is not applicable to this case. 
Apart from the foregoing, Plaintiff s argument fails in 
that Plaintiff attempts to carry agency and contract theory over 
to attorney representation of particular clients, where in this 
case it is simply not applicable. The facts remain that Strong 
represented Gaddis personally, who was sued by Plaintiff 
personally, and Strong entered into the Settlement with respect 
to Gaddis personally (as to his personal interest in property, if 
any). Strong did not represent the interest of Snyderville West 
nor Snyderville West's ownership in the subject property. See 
this section, supra. And the property was in the name of and 
owned by Snyderville West, not Gaddis. 
Plaintiff now argues in this appeal that Gaddis, 
through Strong' s action in Settlement &n his behalf only, has 
bound Snyderville West, which partnership was (a) never served, 
(b) never intended by Gaddis or Strong to be bound by Strong' s 
actions in settlement, and (c) never intended lay. Plaintiff at 
that time to be bound by the Settlement. It is undisputed that 
Snyderville West, not being a party to the Settlement, took 
nothing (got no benefit) from the Stipulation for Settlement. 
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Nor did Gaddis take anything through the Settlement. And yet 
Plaintiff is seeking to take away Snyderville West' s property, 
for which Snyderville West at the time of the Settlement had paid 
the full purchase price of $120, 000 and had obtained title by 
Warranty Deed. Plaintiff should not be permitted to ignore the 
facts and equities of this case in making her arguments. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 
AGAINST SNYDERVILLE WEST IN NOT 
GIVING ANY GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL 
BEYOND MAKING REFERENCE TO THE 
MEMORANDA. 
By Motion to Dismiss filed May 12, 1989, Snyderville 
West moved to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint against Snyderville 
West for the reasons that (i) there was no compliance with Rule 
4(b)" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and (ii) the 
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against Snyderville West. Snyderville West submitted a 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion (R. 0998), and Plaintiff 
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Snyderville West' s Motion 
(R. 1005). Snyderville West then submitted a Memorandum in Reply 
to Plaintiff's Opposition to Snyderville West's Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 1014). On June 5, 1989, the Court made its Minute 
Entry {R. 1019), in which it stated as follows: 
"After NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION is received and respective 
MEMORANDA reviewed, Court rules as 
follows: 
1. Defendant Snyderville 
West's MOTION TO DISMISS is 
granted. 
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2. Counsel for defendant to 
prepare appropriate Order. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in rulings on motions, except 
as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for 
its decisions on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) 
and (b), 5 6, and 5 9 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
In this instance, Judge Frederick as his "brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision" referred to the 
above-referenced memoranda. Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the trial court in supporting the trial court' s ruling, the 
arguments of Snyderville West as advanced in its two memoranda 
must be taken as the grounds and basis for the trial court' s 
decision to grant Snyderville West' s Motion to Dismiss. 
As is amply documented in the record, and supported by 
Snyderville West' s said two memoranda, either the application of 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure QJO the failure of 
the Complaint to state a cause of action as to Snyderville West 
are adequate grounds for dismissal of the Complaint against 
Snyderville West. See Snyderville West memoranda, at R. 0998-
1002; R. 1014-1018. 
A- Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Requires 
that the Complaint be Dismissed. 
Rule 4(b) provides as follows: 
(b) Time of Issuance and 
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Service. If an action is commenced 
by the filing of a complaint, 
summons must issue thereon within 
three months from the date of such 
filing. The summons must be served 
within one year after filing of the 
complaint or the action will be 
deemed dismissed, provided that in 
any action brought against two or 
more defendants in which personal 
service has been obtained upon one 
of them within the year, the other 
or others may be served or appear 
at any time before trial. 
It is apparent from the rule that it is too late to 
serve a defendant after trial. Defendant Snyderville West 
respectfully submits that it is too late to serve a defendant 
after judgment. In this action, judgment pursuant to the 
settlement agreement of all those parties to this lawsuit that 
had properly been served, was entered on January 14, 1986. 
Service on Snyderville West was not effectuated until March 27, 
1989. 
The term "judgment" has been defined as: 
[T]he law's l a s t word in a jud ic ia l 
c o n t r o v e r s y ; i t i s t h e f i n a l 
consideration and determination of 
a court of competent j u r i sd i c t i on 
upon the matter submitted to i t in 
an action or proceeding. Thus, a j u d g m e n t of d i s m i s s a l w i t h 
prejudice i s a final judgment of 
the court. An agreed judgment or 
consent judgment i s a judgment 
e n t e r e d on agreement of t h e 
par t i e s . I t is nothing technical , 
but merely an agreement of the 
p a r t i e s which r e c e i v e s t h e 
sanction of the court. I t i s a 
contract between the par t ies to an 
a g r e e m e n t , o p e r a t e s as an 
adjudication between them and, when 
the court gives the agreement i t s 
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sanction, becomes a judgment of the 
court. The fact that the judgment 
is by consent gives neither greater 
nor less force than if rendered 
after protracted litigation, except 
to the extent that it excuses error 
and operates to end all controversy 
between the parties. It has the 
same weight and effect as any other 
judgment and, unless vacated or set 
aside, stands as a final 
determination of the rights of the 
parties. Tyavel^r' ? In§T gpT v,, 
United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 28-
29 (S.D.Tex. 1968) [citations 
omitted]. 
Like the terms "judgment" or "agreed judgment," the 
term "trial" denotes a process which operates as a final 
adjudication of the issues. The judgment in this case was 
functionally equivalent to a trial as that term is used in Rule 
4(b). 
B. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action 
Against Snyderville West. 
The complaint in this action merely states that title 
should be quieted in the Plaintiff. At this point in time, as 
the record reflects, there are extensive affidavits and exhibits 
which reflect the fact that Snyderville West purchased the 
subject property and paid for it. See supra. Snyderville West 
believes that the Complaint in this case is grossly inadequate. 
The Complaint, in order to state a claim in which relief can be 
granted, must state some factual or legal basis that the land 
purchased, paid for and deeded to Snyderville West does not 
belong to Snyderville West. To merely allege that Plaintiff 
wishes to quiet title without further reasoning or explanation is 
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unsatisfactory. 
This is especially true at this point in the 
proceedings. Plaintiff served a copy of her original complaint 
on Snyderville West in 1989, after all of the proceedings and 
evidence leading up to the court' s setting aside of the default 
judgment. The factual evidence brought before the court made it 
clear that Snyderville West bought and paid for its property. To 
serve a "quiet title complaint" on Snyderville West, when 
Plaintiff had all the facts concerning Snyderville West' s 
purchase of the subject property before herself, is improper. 
It is well established that a pleading should not be 
filed unless the party and counsel believe that after reasonable 
inquiry, "it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." Rule 11 U. R. C. P. and 
Rule 40(a) Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Snyderville West 
believes that a requirement for a proper Complaint in this case 
against defendant Snyderville West, is that this complaint must 
state some grounds for relief in light of the Plaintiff s and 
counsel' s knowledge at this point that Snyderville West purchased 
the property, paid for it and has had the property deeded to it. 
As stated above, in Section IV(D) supra. Plaintiff had 
both actual and constructive knowledge of Snyderville West' s 
contract interest, but failed in her Complaint to allege a breach 
of contract. Under Utah law, the seller of an estate does not 
have an interest in land, but only the seller' s right under a 
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contract, which is a personal right. Butler v. Wilkinson, supra. 
But even if the trial court should have stated the 
grounds for dismissal as a condition precedent to effect a 
dismissal, pursuant to Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the trial court should be given the opportunity to set forth the 
grounds for dismissal, rather than setting aside the dismissal as 
sought by Plaintiff. The trial court clearly had good reasons 
for ruling for Snyderville West, and if required by this Court 
should be given the opportunity to set forth those reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
As found by the trial court below, Plaintiff was not 
entitled to have default judgment against Snyderville West in 
this case. Given that Plaintiff had the correct address of 
Snyderville West, but failed to attempt personal service of 
Snyderville West at that address, and instead attempted service 
by mail, but used the incorrect address, the trial court 
correctly found that Plaintiff was not entitled to have default 
judgment. 
It is undisputed that Snyderville West entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to purchase the subject property in 
1978 from Investor Associates, whose agent was Robert W. Major, 
Jr., now deceased, the decedent of the Estate of Major. A Notice 
of the Real Estate Contract was placed of record in 1978 in the 
Summit County Recorder' s Office. The purchase price for the 
subject property was $120,000.00, of which $20,000.00 was paid as 
a down payment by Snyderville West in 1978 and the balance was 
- 39 -
paid in installments together with interest between 1978 and 
1983, with the final payment made in August, 1983. Following 
payment in full of the purchase price, Snyderville West obtained 
a Warranty Deed. That Deed was placed of record prior to entry 
of the default judgment. 
This lawsuit was commenced by Plaintiff in April, 1983. 
The record discloses that Plaintiff knew of the interest of 
Snyderville West in the subject property through an investigation 
by Plaintiff s attorneys and through the 1982 Title Report which 
Plaintiff obtained in connection with the preparation of her 
case. Plaintiff knew the "tax address" of Snyderville West, 
which was Snyderville West' s actual address, and knew of the 
identity of other persons to whom Plaintiff could have obtained 
information about Snyderville West. Snyderville West at all 
relevant times could have been personally served with Summons and 
Complaint at Snyderville West' s known address. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not in fact serve 
Snyderville West. The testimony of attorney T. Richard Davis who 
was principally responsible for obtaining service of process on 
the several defendants, was that no Summons was ever prepared for 
Snyderville West. Further, Davis in his Affidavit represented to 
the Court that Plaintiff was unable to serve Snyderville West, 
which was not true. 
It is likewise undisputed that Plaintiff did not intend 
to serve Snyderville West, when it served defendant Jim Gaddis 
personally. Gaddis was one of seventy defendants which 
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Plaintiff named. Plaintiff prepared the Summons for Gaddis, as a 
Summons personally for Gaddis and not in his capacity as agent, 
managing partner or otherwise for Snyderville West. Gaddis' 
Summons was served at Gaddis' business address, 12 53 East 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, which was the precise address 
of Snyderville West. 
Plaintiff could have served Snyderville West at its 
actual address, if it had tried to. Plaintiff knew from the 
Return of Service on Gaddis that someone was at that address, and 
that service of process could be had at that address. All that 
Plaintiff would have needed to have done would have been to send 
a process server to Snyderville West's known address, where 
service in fact could have been had readily on Snyderville West. 
Notwithstanding the attempts of Plaintiff to show 
otherwise in Plaintiff s Brief of Appellant, service on the 
defendant Jim Gaddis is not the same as service on the defendant 
Snyderville West. Gaddis was served individually, in his 
individual capacity, as a defendant separate and apart from 
Snyderville West. Plaintiff did not intend to serve Snyderville 
West by service on Gaddis, and in fact made representations and 
produced Affidavits to the court that Snyderville West had not 
been served (although the defendant Gaddis had been served). 
There was nothing in the Summons to indicate to Gaddis that 
service was being made on Snyderville West. 
Although Plaintiff in her Brief of Appellant suggests 
otherwise, there is no evidence or testimony in the record that 
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indicates that Snyderville West attempted to keep its identity or 
its property ownership a secret, much less conceal itself to 
avoid service. Snyderville West put its Notice of real estate 
purchase of the subject property of record in 1978, and took 
title to the property and recorded its Warranty Deed in 1983. 
Snyderville West was listed on the tax rolls of Summit County as 
the owner of the property, from which records Plaintiff in fact 
obtained Snyderville West' s true address. 
Contrary to the argument by Plaintiff, Utah law 
requires the exercise of "due diligence" on the part of a 
plaintiff to effect personal service of process, and only when 
that fails may Plaintiff move for alternative service of process. 
Patently, Plaintiff failed to rise to even the lowest standard of 
"due diligence" by failure to even prepare a Summons and 
Complaint directed at Snyderville West and take that process and 
drive to Snyderville West' s address. Plaintiff s failure to take 
even these initial steps makes ridiculous Plaintiff s assertions 
as raised in Plaintiff s Brief of Appellant that there was an 
exercise of "due diligence." 
It was this blatant failure to perform even the most 
basic effort to comply with requirements for service of process 
which supports Judge Murphy' s ruling setting aside the default 
judgment, and the carefully worded language of his Minute Entry. 
Substitute service by publication and mail is not 
effective, when by application of the most rudimentary levels of 
diligence the defendant Snyderville West could have been served 
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at its address. The Court as shown by its Minute Entry was 
properly concerned that, at the least, the Motion and supporting 
Affidavit of Plaintiff were misleading to the Court in suggesting 
that personal service had been attempted without success at 
Snyderville West' s last known address. In fact, there was never 
an attempt to serve Snyderville West at that or any other 
address. Because the Affidavit failed to have the proper 
foundation for the Motion, as to Snyderville West, the Court 
should never have authorized service by publication. 
But even if the Court properly on the basis of 
Plaintiff's self serving Motion and Affidavit could have 
determined that substituted service by mail would be proper, the 
records shows that service of process was sent to the incorrect 
address. The only definite evidence in the record with respect 
to the address at which service was sent is the Clerk' s 
Certificate, which clearly shows that the process was sent to an 
address other than Snyderville West' s last known address. There 
is no definite evidence that Snyderville West ever received 
service of process by mail, and it must be concluded for purposes 
of this appeal that it did not. 
The remaining issue raised by Plaintiff on this appeal 
was that because the trial court dismissed the Complaint without 
elaborating on the ground for dismissal, beyond reference to the 
memoranda of the parties, the dismissal must be set aside. But 
the record amply supports either of Snyderville West' s two stated 
grounds for dismissal. But even if the trial court should have 
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stated the grounds for dismissal with greater particularity as a 
condition precedent to effect a dismissal, the trial court should 
be given the opportunity to set forth the grounds for dismissal. 
DATED this <^ j day of January, 1990. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
.chard A. Rappa£a#:t/ 
William B. Wray, Jr. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was hand delivered this day of January, 
1990, to the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Virginia Curtis Lee 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
Fifth Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
snyder2. bri 
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ADDENDUM 
Summons served on Gaddis personally on May 11, 1983. (R. 
0050-0053). 
Affidavit of Reese S. Howell, with attached Exhibits 1-4. 
(R. 0625-0633). 
Relevant pages from the June 10, 1982 Commitment for Title 
Insurance ("1982 Title Report") addressed to Robert Orton, 
attorney for Plaintiff, disclosing in Exceptions Nos. 53 and 
83 the interest of Snyderville West. (R. 1030, Exhibit 23). 
Clerk' s Affidavit of Mailing, showing that the Summons 
directed at Snyderville West was sent to the wrong address. 
(R. 0300-0303). 
Excerpts from the deposition testimony of T. Richard Davis, 
attorney for Plaintiff. (R. 1030# pp 13, 14# 22# 23, 28, 
35-39, 46, 48, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60-68, 85, 89, 90, 92). 
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A T T O R N E Y S F O R P L A I N T I F F 
6B SOUTH MAIN, F IFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
T E L E P H O N E : (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0 
MAYl/? 1983 
-*erk oi Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KNGLISH INN C O . , I N C . , a U t a h 
C o r p o r a t i o n ; PARK CITY UTAH 
CORPORATION, a U t a h C o r p o r a t i o n ; 
CHARLES E . HIRSCH; HAROLD D. 
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER; EUGENE H. 
rOWERT; MASASHI HA SHI DA; J . E . 
ROBERTS a / k / a JACK E . ROBERTS; 
rROSTWOOD LIMITED, a U t a h 
l i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p ; J . L. 
KROFCHECK a / k / a JOSEPH L . 
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L . BARRETT; 
^NYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP 
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, I N C . , a 
C o r p o r a t i o n ; PARK WEST WATER 
ASSOCIATION, a U t a h N o n - P r o f i t 
C o r p o r a t i o n ; HALBET ENGINEERING, 
INC. , a C a l i f o r n i a C o r p o r a t i o n ; 
HALBET PROPERTIES, I N C . , a U t a h 
C o r p o r a t i o n ; MAJOR-BLAKENEi 
CORPORATION, a C a l i f o r n i a 
S U M M O N S 
C i v i l N o . 7325 
/ -,/ 
/ " 7 
0050 
1 Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; LESTER F. 
2 HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT; 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah 
3 Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK 
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST 
4 LAND COMPANY; INVESTOR ASSOCIATES, 
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorpor-
5 ated Association; WILLIAM S. 
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND 
g LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
J. ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES, 
7 INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL 
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN, 
8 Trustee; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah 
9 Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS; 
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE 
10 COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
Trustee; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
11 OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation; 
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY; 
12 SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY 
13 MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a Californ-
14 ia Limited Partnership; ROBERT 
W. ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
15 CORPORATION, a Corporation; 
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a 
16 Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT 
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE 
17 & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
I Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES, 
18 j a Utah General Partnership; JAMES 
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
19 Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY 
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL; 
20 DIANA L. LESUEUR; Z. J. SLAGEL 
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN; 
21 JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS; 
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New 
22 York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK; 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK; 
23 JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive; 
and all other persons unknown 
24 claiming any right, title, or 
0051 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
interest in or lien against the real 
property described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding his title 
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation; 
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; GREAT 
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; INN 
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation; 
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS & 
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX; 
JIM GAQD.IS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 25 THROUGH 50, 
Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer 
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-
entitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to either ROBERT F. 
ORTON or T. RICHARD DAVIS, of the Law Firm of MARSDEN, ORTON & 
LILJENQUIST, 68 South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, a copy of said Answer within TWENTY (20) DAYS after service 
of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, Judgment by Default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has 
been filed with the Clerk of said Court, and a copy of which is 
attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED THIS <> day of May, 1983. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
005£ 
'HE FtUHNEFt 3SHVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE s s -
'(u\M fvlQf, hi 
Suit* 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 I I 
Telephone: (801) 364-8250 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Civil No. ~7^? ^ £ 
^hereby make an affidavit of service, and certify that: 
received the: 
ORDER 2t~~ SUMMONS _ 
CHECK , SUBPOENA _ 
MOTION J ^ " COMPLAINT _ 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER _ 
SMALL CLAIMS AFFIDAVIT & ORDER 
MOTION AND ORDER IN SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
OTHER: 
GARNISHMENT 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
SUBPOENA DEUCES TECUM 
NOTICE OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
and served it upon the respondent(s) listed below, on the date shown below, at the place 
listed below, by leaving a copy with the respondent(s) personally, or by leaving a copy 
with the agent of the respondent(s), or by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age 
and discretion residing at the usual place of abode of the respondent(s). 
2. I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer, or am a person over the age of 21 
years, and am not a party to this action. 
3. I endorsed the date and place of service and my name on the copy served. 
Name of Respondent(s) 
relationship: 
TYPE OF SERVICE: 
Date Served 
-STW/-0 
Date Received 
Where Served 
/2S~Z> £\ ^ / ^ 5 
County of /fi^t 
UTAH 
•/-hCL £. 
persona __. . _ ... .. , with agent of respondent 3 . _ ^ ^ 
person of suitable age and discretion residing at the usual place of abj^ffrflfYtffCfoN!^ 
respondent(s) 4. I showed the original subpoena to the respondent and j y W 5 > ^ Th^v ^y 
respondent of its contents. 
Fees: 
Service $ / • /^ 
111 age S 5 7 ^ 
)ther $ _ _ 
[OTflL %CZZl 
Subscribed 5~U-%3 s cTaod sworn to befoxfi_me: ^y- }^X- \ 
NOTARY PUBLIC Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: Lp- c?«&?~ ^^T 
I \ / > r— r% 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
William B* Wray, Jr. (Bar No. 3559) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (Bar No. 5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT <5c SEGAL 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Snyderville West 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
REESE S. HOWELL, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, being duly 
sworn upon oath, deposes and says that the following facts, on personal knowledge, are 
true: 
1. I am presently and at all times since January 1, 1978 have been a VI 
President with Title Insurance Agency. 
0625 
EXHIBIT." H" 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
REESE S. HOWELL 
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANT SNYDERVILLE WEST 
Civil No. 7325 
2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, and the 
area of my practice is in real property law. 
3. I personally assisted as an officer of Title Insurance Agency in that certain 
transaction entered into on or about July 13, 1978, wherein Snyderville West, a 
partnership, as buyer, and Investor Associates, as seller, executed a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (the "Contract"), a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit Ttln, 
covering among other property a seven-acre parcel of property situated in Summit 
County, State of Utah, together with an appurtenant easement, which seven-acre parcel 
and easement are more particularly described in Exhibit "2" attached hereto (the 
"Snyderville West Property"). 
4. In said transaction, among other things, I witnessed the execution of the 
Contract by Robert W. Major, Jr., who was also known as R. W. Major and Robert W. 
Major, for and on behalf of Investor Associates, and I notarized the signature of Robert 
W. Major, Jr. on a Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract for and on behalf of the 
seller, Investor Associates. A true copy of said Notice of Contract is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "3". Said Notice was recorded in the Summit County Records, on July 14, 1978 as 
Entry No. 147707. 
5. In connection with the preparation of the Memorandum of Snyderville West 
in this case, I was requested to examine the title documents of record in the Summit 
County Records pertaining to the Snyderville West Property. 
6. On the basis of my examination of title, it is my opinion that by virtue of a 
Quit-Claim Deed dated November 1, 1976, recorded July 14, 1978 as Entry No. 147704 in 
the Summit County Records, Joseph L. Krofcheck ("Krofcheck") was vested with and held 
good title of record to the Snyderville West Property. Thereafter, Joseph L. Krofcheck 
0026 
by Quit-Claim Deed dated November 5, 1977, recorded July 14, 1978 as Entry No. 147706 
in the Summit County Records conveyed the Snyderville West Property to Investor 
Associates. Thereafter, Investor Associates by Quit-Claim Deed dated June 6, 1980, 
recorded July 7, 1980 as Entry No. 168166 conveyed the Snyderville West Property (but 
without express inclusion of the appurtenant easement) to J. L. Krofcheck. It is my 
understanding and belief that Joseph L. Krofcheck and J. L. Krofcheck are one and the 
same person. 
Thereafter, by Warranty Deed (undated, but acknowledged October 26, 1983, 
recorded January 19, 1984 as Entry No. 215912 in the Summit County Records), Joseph L. 
Krofcheck conveyed and warranted the Snyderville West Property to Snyderville West. 
7. Based upon my examination of the title documents of record in the Summit 
County Records, there are no instruments of conveyance other than those identified in 
this Affidavit affecting or purporting to affect title to the Snyderville West Property 
between the above-described Quit-Claim Deed which was Entry No. 147704 and the 
above-described Warranty Deed which was Entry No. 215912. 
8. There is no document of record affecting the Snyderville West Property 
which at the present time or at any time in the past vested or purported tp vest in the 
decedent in this case, Robert W. Major, Jr., any right, title or interest in or to the 
Snyderville West Property* 
9. My office of Title Insurance Agency after execution of the Contract acted 
as a collection agent for Snyderville West and the seller, Investor Associates and 
subsequently Krofcheck, until the Contract was paid in full in mid-1983. On or before 
August 16, 1983 my office of Title Insurance Agency received two "Snyderville West" 
account checks from James R. Gaddis for Snyderville West; one check in the amount of 
"
3
" 0627 
$32,210.00 representing payment of the balance in full of the Contract and one check for 
$900.00 plus, for payment of certain tax amounts due the seller. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "4" is a true copy of a letter from me to Krofcheck dated August 16, 1983, which 
supports these facts. 
Reese SU Howell 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this %$ ^day of March, 1988. 
£&5^\ My Commission E: 
Residing ox-. qrfaJji xLbi/I/j.ZuZj, 
*-<£. j*J> • 
mar/Chicago-1 
-4- 0628 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
& 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, persona]* 
representative of the ESTATE* 
OF ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., 
deceased, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC. a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
***** %***$? 4* 
h 
iad*-
Civil No. 7325 
Deposition of: fi 
T. RICHftjgp DAVIS ^ " 
F i t ED " 
* * * AUG 11988 
Clerfc OT ourrunit w u . . T y 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of June/ 
BY
 • ttj^u 
1988, the deposition of T. RICHARD DAVIS, pro<ftBStefi,t*s a 
witness herein at the instance of the Defendants in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before SHIRLYN SHARPE, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. of said day at 525 E. 100 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
* * * 
A S J 7 
„ MERIT ^ 
O REPORTERS O 
SHIRLYN SHARPE 
(801) 322-3742 5 DAY DELIVERY 
185South State Street • Suite 1020 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1030 
i. D. No. 177-cc N? 600235 
.TL&.XL ILILE AJS.U ABSIBAGT Ga&KAttY 
9 SOUTH MAIN STREET • BOX 545 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017 • (801) 336-2532 ZENITH 864 V 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
Robert Orton 
68 S. Main 
5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
S-5383 
Various pa rce l s i n 
Summit County 
J .L. Krofcheck 
\FECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, herein called the Company, for a valuable 
>nsideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance in ALTA Single Form Policy-1970 
averages, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee 
the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the 
emiums and charges therefor, all subject to the provisions of Schedule A and B, and the Conditions and Stipulations 
>reof. 
lis Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or 
)licies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, which Insured and said amount may 
> changed by subsequent endorsement. 
Vis Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and 
ligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or 
)licies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not 
e fault of the Company. 
lis Commitment is further conditioned by the Conditions and Stipulations and Exclusions from Coverage of the basic 
rm of the policy or policies committed to be issued. The examination of the public records made by Company as to 
e land set out in Schedule A was made wholly for determining the insurability of the title to said land and not for 
sporting on the condition of the record. 
J WITNESS WHEREOF, SAFECO Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto 
fixed by its duly authorized officers on the date shown in Schedule A. 
Secretary 
ITP-90 (Rev. 1-79) 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
LI ~OAV; S 
^ w . • T J X 
Uv . . ° * -*C-V V V\VWVxV^ 
WJM 
President 
Authorized Signatur^^/ —^ 
For inqu i r e s c a l l Alan Spriggs 
801-336-2532 
SCHEDULE A 
Order No. S-5383 
Page 2 
1. Effective date: June 10, 1982 @ 8:00 a.m. 
2. Policy or policies to be issued: (check) LITIGATION REPORT 
(a) QX/XIEC&H ) X^OSaSBQGC ) XKSSgfeSX ( 
Name of proposed Insured: Amount: $1,451.25 
TO BE DETERMINED 
(b) Mortgage-Standard Coverage ( ) 
Name of proposed Insured: 
Mortgage-Extended Coverage ( ) 
Amount: $ 
3. The estate or interest in the land described in this Commitment and covered herein is: 
Fee Simple 
4. Title to the estate or interest referred to herein is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is in the State of Utah, County of Summit 
and is described as follows: 
See Exhibit B attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
SCHEDULE A 
Commitment (Utah) 
UTP-90A (Rev. 6-79) 
EXHIBIT A 
VESTING 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah Corporation as to the East 1/2 of Lot 28, Park 
City West Plat No. 1. (Affects a portion of Parcel 1) 
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION as to the following: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of property conveyed to Spencer Osborn 
in Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry No. 108801, in 
Book M20, at page 389, of the Official Records, said point being on the 
North line of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, at a point 
West 2753 feet from the Northeast corner of said Section 1; and running 
thence West 156 feet to the East line of property conveyed to Joseph L. 
Krofcheck, Trustee, in Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 115698, in 
Book M37, at page 650, of the Official Records; thence South along said 
East line 713 feet; thence East 156 feet to a point due South of beginning; 
thence North 713 feet to the point of beginning. (affects a part of Parcel 3) 
AND: 
Beginning at a point 2753 feet West of the Northeast corner of Section 1, 
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; and running thence East 289.5 feet; 
thence South 504.5 feet; thence West 289.5 feet; thence North 504.5 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
AND: 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; The North 165 feet 
of the Southwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 
36; and the South 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of the South-
west 1/4 of Section 36; and the West 100 feet of the North 1/2 of the South-
west 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 36. (being a 
portion of Parcel 4) 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah Limited Partnership as to the following: 
A portion of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, Summit County, 
Utah, as follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the real property covered under the 
Warranty Deed dated January 15, 1970, executed by Homer Ellsworth and Mary 
L. Ellsworth, his wife, in favor of William S. Richards, Trustee, recorded 
January 23, 1970, as Entry No. 110522, in Book M24, at page 564, of Summit 
County records; thence East along the North line of said Section 1, 72.5 
feet; thence, South 713 feet; thence West 72.5 feet; thence, along the 
easterly boundary line of the property described in the aforesaid Warranty 
Deed, Entry No. 110522, North 713 feet to the point of commencement. 
CONTINUED 
Exhibit A Continued 
Also, commencing 72.5 feet east, of the above mentioned real property 
Northeast corner as described in the Warranty Deed Entry No. 110522, 
thence, 72.5 feet east from said beginning point to a point on the North 
line of said Section 1; thence, 713 feet South; thence, 72.5 feet West; 
thence, North 713 feet to the beginning point herein. (being a part of 
Parcel 3) 
AND: 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; Beginning at the 
Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence North along 
the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160 feet; 
thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of 
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress 
and underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of 
a centerline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the South-
east corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, 
more or less, to a right of way south line, which right of way is known as 
"Major Drive" within said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park 
City West Plat No. 1, said plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit 
County records. (Bring Parcel 5) 
CHARLES E. HIRSCH, HAROLD D. HIRSCH & SAM A. HEPNER, subject to the marital 
interest of their spouses, if married as to the following: 
Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Southeast 1/4 of Section 36, Town-
ship 1 South, Range 3 East, SLBM, EXCEPTING THEREFROM: the South 1/2 thereof; 
AND, the South 220 feet of the East 1/2 of the North 1/2 thereof. (Being a 
part of Parcel 8) 
EUGENEE H. POWERT & MASASHI HASHIDA, subject to the marital interest of their 
spouses, if married as to the following: 
That portion of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, encom-
passed by the South 220 feet of the East 1/2 of the North 1/2 of the South-
west 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4 of said Section 36; 
EXCEPT, there is reserved unto the grantors a non-exclusive easement for 
ingress, egress and utilities over and across the Easterly 66 feet of the 
said property, with the further right thereunto reserved by grantors to 
dedicate such easement to public authority for use as a public right of way 
at any time in the future. (Being a part of Parcel 8) 
CONTINUED 
Exhibit A Continued 
J.E. ROBERTS, subject to the Dower Interest of his wife, if married as to: 
The South 330 feet of the West 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M. (Being a part 
of Parcel 8) 
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah Limited Partnership, as to the Easterly approximately 
900.8 feet of Parcel 9 
AND 
J.L.KROFCHECK, aka JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK, subject to the marital interest of 
his wife if married as to the remainder. 
Exhibit B Continued 
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a center-
line commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of 
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or less, to 
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within 
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City West Plat No. 1, said 
plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit County records. 
Parcel No. 6: 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
part of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and 
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest 
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian, Summit County, Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3 
feet; thence East 850.00 feet; thence South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 
feet; thence South 0°17,58n East 474.93 feet to the Southerly boundary of Seller's 
land; thence South 57°30f West 32.8 feet; thence South 81°40f West 299.5 feet; 
thence North 27°28f West 100.6 feet to the West line of the above mentioned 
Section: thence North 0°30f East 82.4 feet along section line to point of begin-
ning. 
Parcel No. 7: 
The Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 36, Township 1 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, less the North 594.0 feet thereof. 
Parcel No. 8: 
The South half of the West half of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel No. 9: 
In Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Beginning at a point on the West line of State Highway 248, which point is 2,608.8 
feet North and 1,412.0 feet, more or less, East of the Southwest corner of said 
Section 31; thence Northerly along the said West line of Highway 248 for 388.5 
feet; thence West 1,412.0 feet, more or less, to a point on the West line of said 
Section 31; thence South 538.5 feet, more or less, along said Section 31 West line: 
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet; thence East 511 feet, more or less, 
to the point of beginning hereof. 
All parcels limited to surface rights only. 
SCHEDULE B-SECTION I 
Order No. S-5383 
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Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the same are 
disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company (all clauses, if any, which indicate any preference, limitation or 
discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin are omitted from all building and use restrictions, 
covenants and conditions, if any, shown herein): 
A. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public 
records, or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed Insured acquires 
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment 
B. STANDARD EXCEPTIONS: 
1. Rights or claims of persons in possession or claiming to be in possession, easements, liens or encumbrances 
including material or labor liens, which are not shown by the public records; reservations in patents or state 
grants, or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof; mineral rights, water rights, clams or title to minerals or 
water.* 
2. Questions of location, boundary and areas; overlaps and encroachments by improvements belonging to 
these or adjoining premises; all dependent upon actual survey for determination.* 
3. Assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the public records; taxes not yet payable; pending 
proceedings for vacating, opening or changing streets or highways preceding entry of the final ordinance or 
order therefor.* 
•Paragraphs 1,2, and 3 will not appear as printed exceptions on extended coverage policies, except as to 
such parts thereof which may be typed as a Special Exception in Schedule B-Section Z 
C. SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS: 
(See Schedule B-Section 2 beginning on next p^ge) 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION I 
Commitment (Utah) n n c c p n 
UTP-90B-1 (Rev. 6-79) SAFECU 
Schedule B Continued 
53. EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN: 
Grantor: 
Grantee: 
Location: 
Purpose: 
Dated:, 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
(affects Parcel 
SNYDERVILLE WEST 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of the Grantors1 
land at a point 502 feet North, more or less, from 
the Southwest corner Section 31, Township 1 South, 
Range 4 East, SLM, thence South 533 feet, more or 
less, to a point on the Grantor's West boundary line 
and being in Lot 4 of said Section 31, and Lot 4 of 
Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLM. 
To construct, operate, maintain and repair electric 
transmission and/or distribution systen, under and 
across the above. 
March 3, 1981 
April 16, 1981 
178411 
M184/678 
6) 
54. Subject to the affect of those certain easements and rights of way as set 
out in Judgment on Stipulation, dated July 23, 1971, and recorded July 26, 
1971, as Entry No. 113601, in Book M32, at page 269, Civil Case No. 4143. 
55. NOTICE OF EASEMENT RIGHTS: 
Given by: PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC. & 
PARK WEST WATER ASSOCIATION 
Location: Sections 35 and 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, and 
Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M. 
Purpose: Easement rights for Water Collection, Transmission and 
Storeage in Willow Creek draw 
Dated: June 29, 1979 
Recorded: July 3, 1979 
Entry No: 157302 
Book/Page: M136/348 
56. EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN: 
Grantor: 
Grantee: 
Location: 
Purpose: 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
A 5 foot easement being 2.5 feet on each side of a buried 
telephone cable over and across property located in 
Section 35 and 36 of Township 1 Sout, Range 3 East, SLB&M. 
To construct, operate, maintain and remove such commun-
ication and other facilities. 
October 22, 1979 
December 26, 1979 
162586 
M148/714 
CONTINUED 
Schedule B Continued 
80. ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT FOR SECURITY PURPOSES 
81. 
Assignor: 
Assignee: 
Amount: 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
DEED OF TRUST 
Trustor: 
Trustee: 
Beneficiary: 
Amount: 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
ASPEN GROVE INC. 
LIFE RESOURCES INC. 
$65,000.00 
November 29 1971 
December 1, 1971 
114526 
M34/570 
(Affects Parcel 4) 
KARL C. LeSUER 
H . J . SAPERSTEIN 
PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY 
$ 2 9 , 4 0 9 . 6 0 p l u s i n t e r e s t 
A p r i l 2 9 , 1976 
J u n e 8 , 1976 
131961 
M80/523 
( A f f e c t s Lot 24 of P a r c e l 1) 
82. 
83. 
DEED OF TRUST 
Trustor: 
Trustee: 
Beneficiary: 
Amount: 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
WAYLAND P. CALKINS & BARBARA CALKINS, husband and wife 
McGHIE LAND TITLE COMPANY 
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF UTAH INC. 
$20,078.19 plus interest 
March 12, 1976 
March 24, 1976 
130999 
M78/274 
(Affects Lot 23 of Parcel 1) 
Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 31, 1978 and recorded 
July 14, 1978, as Entry No. 147707, in Book M116, at page 363, of Official 
Records, wherein Snyderville West claims an interest in Parcel 6 by virtue 
of an Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
84. FINANCING STATEMENT 
Debtor: 
Creditor: 
For: 
Recorded: 
Entry No: 
Book/Page: 
JOHN CANEPARI 
KERRY D. BODILY 
All inventory, rolling stock, rails, engines, mechanical 
parts and attendant mechanics of a ride known as "Skyrider" 
October 1, 1981 
184180 
M199/717 
CONTINUED 
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ROBERT F . ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
T E L E P H O N E : (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0 
I r n 
h- 1 9 1> P I 
P *•*(?• v ri«: ,; - -~<f 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a 
Utah Corporation; et al., 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
Civil No. 737.5 
ss, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
states: 
1. He is the Clerk of the District Court in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
2. The Summons, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
0300 
"A" and by this reference incorporated herein, was received in the 
office of the County Clerk of Summit County, State of Utah, on or 
before the /£i&j\i,ik day of QofrQibor, 1983. 
3. The Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and by this reference incorporated herein, was received 
in the office of the County Clerk of Summit County, State of Utah, 
Decernbex 
on or before the fbU'* R-tk, days of Oe-boteer, 1983. 
4. The undersigned mailed a true and correct copy of said 
Summons to each of the Defendants listed below at their respective 
addresses by addressing and dispatching a copy of said Summons and 
a copy of said Complaint, postage prepaid: 
•'(a) Charles E. Hirsch, 1030 - 20th Street, 
Santa Monica, California, 90403; 
/(b) Harold D. Hirsch, 1030 - 20th Street, 
Santa Monica, California, 90403; 
'/(c) Eugene H. Powert, c/o Alpine Ski Shop, 
8808 South Sepulveda Boulevard, Westchester, California, 
90045; 
/(d) Masahi Hashida, c/o Alpine Ski Shop, 8808 
South Sepulveda Boulevard, Westchester, California, 90045; 
/(e) Snyderville West, 1253 East 7100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84106 (tax notice address) ; 
^(f) Park West Water Association, c/o Rinehart L. 
0301 
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P,eshell, Agent, 606 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111; 
(g) Aspen Grove, Inc., c/o Richard S. Hallmark 
or Savery L. Nash, 647 Camino De Los Mares, San Clemente, 
California, 92672; 
(h) J. Robert West, 525 South Rancho Avenue, 
Colton, California, 92324; 
(i) Ensign Co., c/o Robert W. Ensign, 6931 Crest 
Road, Palos Verdes Penin, California, 90274; 
vj) Robert W. Ensign, 6931 Crest Road, Palos Verdes 
Penin, California, 90274; 
W W ^ ^ (k) Park West Associates, c/o Walter J. Plumb, 
III, 809 Edgehill Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah^or 57 
West 200 South, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101; 
(1) John Muller, 8253 Van Nuys, Los Angeles, 
California; 
(m) Gerald W. Walters, 1235 Columbia Place, 
Pasadena, California, 91101; 
hm't. <uuk (n) Frostwood Limited, 3841 South Cove Point 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah^or c/o Joseph A. Bond, Jr., 
241 North Vine, Midvale, Utah, 84047; 
(o) Ski Park City West, Inc., c/o Robert C. 
Tucker, P. 0. Box 1476, Park City, Utah, 84060; 
(p) National Property Management, Inc., c/o 
0302 
Richard S. Hallmark or Savery L. Nash, 64 7 Camino 
De Los Mares, San Clemente, California, 92672; 
?^ cuM*^>V (q) John Taylor Lott, rumored to live in Bloomington, 
Utah; tax notices sent c/o Ike Koleman and Lester 
Eddington, Box 9, Park City, Utah, 84060. 
DATED this /?# day of £ ^ 2 ^ , 1983. 
BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
C^|^ jQx QshgyJL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /<? day of 
Qo^ tobe^ -, 1983, 
h-y+fj/yJ\ Zi^r-s>-
NOTARY PUBLIC// 
Residing at: £ ^,c t^WC V/W 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
0303 
OriiGlNAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
% 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, personal: 
representative of the ESTATES 
OF ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., &. 
deceased, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC. a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
Sswwr* *-. rj?Q£ 
%g^ 'iaa&? 
^
J
 * i kmm *Jr • w a 
C i v i l No. 7325 
Deposition of: 
T. RICHftRp DAVIS 
F I L E D 
>> 
i* 
o * * ' . $•%* T^ * 
* * * AUG 119 
G e i * oi o in rum? 
BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h e 8 t h day of J u n e , ' 
BY. 
.ti&S-
1988, the deposition of T. RICHARD DAVIS, prodOtS&&wks a 
witness herein at the instance of the Defendants in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before SHIRLYN SHARPE, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. of said day at 525 E. 100 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
* * * 
*sst 
^ MERIT ^ 
^ REPORTERS O 
SHIRLYN SHARPE 
(801) 322-3742 5 DAY DELIVERY 
185South State Street • Suite 1020 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1030 
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A. The last thing I did that I can recall was 
consulting with Mr. Cahoon in the preparation of the tax 
returns. And I would guess that would have probably been in 
the winter of *85-86. 
Q. Do you recall anything more specifically, before or 
after Christmas? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Christmas, 1985? 
A. I can't remember whether it was before or after. 
Q. Did your involvement with this case continue all the 
way through the entry of default judgment against the various 
parties that were served by publication? 
A. It did. 
Q. What were your responsibilities with respect to the 
matter of service of process on the named defendants and 
service by publication when personal service was not able to 
be effected? 
A. Well, I was responsible to make sure that all of the 
named defendants were served. 
Q. Was it your sole responsibility or did you share that 
responsibility with someone else? 
A. I guess it was my responsibility. We consulted — 
Bob and I consulted very frequently on this matter. We used 
Blake Miller, who was a brand new associate at the time, to 
help us track down addresses and some of the investigation of 
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who were these different people and entities. So, I can't say 
it was my sole responsibility. 
We also used the staff to do telephone searches and 
the like, to try to gather information about these defendants. 
Q. Do you recall which of your staff members would have 
been so involved? 
A. I know that a secretary named Edie Despain was 
involved. 
Q. Was she your secretary? 
A. She was — she did some work for me. She was 
primarily Bob's secretary. 
Q. Bob Orton, you're referring to? 
A. Yes. I believe we probably got some assistance from 
Gail Zesiger. 
Q. How do you spell that, Z-E-S-I-G-E-R? 
MR. ORTON: Z-I-Z-E-G-E-R. 
A. I couldn't guess anymore. There may have been other 
staff involved, but I don't — 
Q. Did you say she was a secretary, also? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Whose secretary was she? 
A. Primarily Milo Marsden's. 
Q. Is Edie Despain still with the firm? 
A. She is not. 
Q. When did she leave? 
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dated 1978, and it is the same as Parcel 6 in the Complaint in 
Civil No. 7325, as you have affirmed. 
Can you tell me how that legal description set forth 
in Parcel No. 6 happened to be attached to the Complaint? 
A. Yes, I can. We went up to — when I say "we,11 I'm 
saying Blake Miller was sent to the Summit County Recorder's 
Office and asked to search for any real properties which were 
in the name of Robert Major, Joe Krofcheck, Investor 
Associates, several other of the named defendants. Would you 
like me to give you the rest of them? 
Q. Sure. You said he was sent to the County Recorder's 
Office? 
A. Yes. Investor Associates, New York Investors, City 
Development Corporation, Inc., Ski Park City West Inc., Park 
City Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeny, Park City West 
Association, Snyderville Land Company, English Inn Company, 
Inc. and Inn Investors. We asked him to research any and get 
descriptions of any of those parcels, any parcels in Summit 
County in this Park West area which were titled in any of those 
names. 
Q. If I understood you correctly, you did not name Jim 
Gaddis or Snyderville West or Gaddis Investments or Gaddis 
Associates? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And how was it that it was determined that he should 
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search for those properties titled in those names? 
A. Those were corporations or entities which were owned ]Lj 
or were alter egos of Robert Major. 
Q. How did you know that. 
A. By researching those documents in the twenty-two 
boxes, or twenty-four or however many there were. 
Q. When did Mr. Blake Miller do that, go up to the 
Summit County Recorder's Office? 
A. I don't know when he went up there. 
Q. You're referring to a document now, as you say that. 
Is there any date or any indication from — 
A. It would have been prior to the filing of the 
Complaint. That's about all I can tell you. 
Q. But it was while you personally were working on the 
case? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Was it you personally that went through the 
twenty-two boxes and identified those names? 
A. I did go through each box. 
Q. So, you were the one that went through the boxes and 
pulled out the names? 
A. I did. I'm not the only person who looked through 
those files. I think there were occasions where all of us went 
through one file or another looking for certain documents, but 
I personally went through each one of them. 
(Examination by Mr. Wray) 28 
have — I have no recollection of how I got that. I may have 
gotten it through information from someone else or through — I 
don't know, maybe it is listed there in the telephone book. I 
don't know. 
Q. Mr. Davis, why don't you continue through that 
Exhibit 18. At this point, on what would be the 6th page, 
including the small little yellow — or white note sheet in the 
front, it commences with a document which appears to be 
different from the previous document, at least in different 
handwriting. Can you explain what that document is? 
A. These are Blake Miller's notes. And I believe they 
are from the County Recorder's Office or maybe from the 
Assessor's Office up in Summit County. Snyderville West is 
listed on the second of those pages as No. 2, with the address 
of 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84106, with a 
little note to the side saying "Tax notices," and there is a 
designation of a tax identification number of a certain parcel 
of property. 
Q. What is that tax identification number? 
A. PP 102-B-10-11. 
Q* Do you know what parcel of property that pertains to? 
A. I do not. 
Q. For the record, I would represent to you that is not 
the seven-acre parcel. 
MR. ORTON: It is not? 
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I don't know. 
Q. Did you assume that an agent was necessary for 
service on Snyderville West? You mentioned you didn't have 
the name of an agent. 
A. We didn't know what Snyderville West was. 
Q. But you don't recall whether or not you had an 
address for Snyderville West at the time when that was 
prepared? 
A. At the time of the preparation of this, I do not 
recall. 
Q. Getting back to what Mr. Blake Miller was instructed 
to do, if I remember your testimony earlier correctly — and 
correct me if I don't remember it correctly — I think you said 
that the Marsden-Orton firm sent him up to the County 
Recorder's office prior to the filing of the lawsuit to 
determine what lands might have been in the names of those 
various affiliated entities of Major? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And it was at that time, then, that he determined 
that Snyderville West was listed in the County Recorder's 
Office and they had a tax address? 
A. I don't think that was the time he determined that. 
That was the time that we got the properties back and then we 
got a title search ordered on those properties. After that, he 
made several trips up to the Summit County offices to research 
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who these people were and where they were. The first trip was 
just to find what properties — that was your question before, 
how we decided what properties were to be involved. That is 
how we decided that. 
Q. Please excuse my lack of recollection of the 
preciseness of your testimony earlier, but returning to 
Deposition Exhibit 18, about the sixth page in where it 
describes Snyderville West and gave that address. Did I 
understand your testimony, then, that you do not know when that 
information was obtained? 
A. That,s correct. 
Q. And that you may not have had that information at the 
time the lawsuit was filed; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So, we really don't know how the legal description 
for the lands was obtained or we have not established that by 
your testimony? 
A. I think that's incorrect. 
Q. Okay, please clarify it. 
A. The legal description was decided by taking the names 
of those entities which I gave you, of being owned or operated 
by Robert Major, and running those through the Recorder's 
Office or tax rolls or whatever rolls you could find up there, 
to find out what properties were titled in those names. We 
then brought those property descriptions and platted those out 
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and brought those back down and researched those to see if, 
indeed, those were owned by Major. And if they were, then we 
sent back to the title company asking them for a Title Report 
to find whose names we should include on the Complaint. 
Q. Was it Blake Miller that went up there to do that 
initial work? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And it was Blake Miller that did this, but they may 
not have been at the same time? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. ORTON: By "this," you're referring to 
Exhibit 18? 
MR. WRAY: Approximately page 6. Thank you very 
much, Bob. 
Q. You're not able to testify, based on your knowledge, 
as to when this.— "this," again, being page 6 of Exhibit 18 
that has Snyderville West — was determined, along with the 
address? 
A. I don't know when that was determined. Apparently, 
it was not early in the proceedings because, as we've looked 
at several pages in this file, there were blanks next to 
Snyderville West's name. 
Q. Mr. Davis, there are copies of correspondence and 
legal documents remaining in this file folder, which file 
folder, by the way, is identified as "Service By Publication-
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Major Estate 2109.1" on a white sticker on an eight and-a-half 
by fourteen envelope with an orange strip on the top. That's 
correct? 
A. It is. 
Q. Would you look through the remaining documents and 
tell me if there are any documents that refer to Gaddis 
Investments, Jim Gaddis or Snyderville West, please? 
A. There is a cover letter of October 14, 1983 to Summit 
County Clerk asking the clerk to file the Motion for Permission 
of Service of Summons by Publication, together with the 
affidavit, and asks the court to sign the order; and 
thereafter, directing her to mail the Summons to each of the 
addresses. I guess that indirectly concerns Snyderville West 
because they were listed on this Motion for Permitting Service 
of Summons by Publication. They are listed as Party E on page 
2 of that motion. They are also listed as Party E on page 2 of 
the affidavit. That is my affidavit in support of the motion. 
The affidavit is also dated October 14, 1983. Snyderville West 
is listed as having a tax notice address of 1253 East 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84106. 
Q. Stopping for a moment at that document, that document 
is dated October 14, 1983 and signed by you; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Based on reviewing that document in the context of 
the time in which it was executed, do you have a recollection 
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now as to when and under what circumstances the address for 
Snyderville West became known, apart from what you've already 
testified? 
A. Sometime between May of x83 and October of *83. 
Q. As far as the circumstances, does this refresh your 
recollection at all? 
A. The same answer I gave you before. I think Blake 
Miller discovered something in the name of Snyderville West on 
the tax records of Snyderville — or of Summit County. You 
told us today that it was on a different parcel of property, 
but he did find that name up there. 
I find Snyderville West is also listed in the Order 
Authorizing Directing Service by Publication on page 2, 
Defendant E, with the same tax notice address. That order 
appears it was executed on December 6, 1983 by Judge Hansen. A 
copy of the Summons which lists Snyderville West as 
Defendant E. The Summons, I believe, was the one directed to 
be published, including, I guess, that Parcel 6, the property 
you were speaking about earlier in this deposition. 
Q. That being the seven-acre parcel that we spoke about? 
A. I guess that's what it is. There is an Affidavit of 
Mailing or a copy of that affidavit. This is an unsigned copy 
and it includes Snyderville West as E, Defendant E. And there 
is a typographical error in that notice that the tax notice 
address, instead of saying 2100 South, says 7100 South. The 
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Snyderville West until the past week or so. 
If I might also add to that testimony, I reviewed the 
names of the parties that we didn't know who they were with 
Mr. Don Strong, who is counsel for many of the defendants, and 
asked him if he knew who any of these were, and he did not. 
Snyderville West was one of those on that list, and he was not 
familiar with it. 
Q. When would that have taken place? 
A. Sometime before the publication. Sometime in the 
summer of 1983. 
Q. When you say the publication, you mean the 
publication of service? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I believe you testified earlier that Don Strong — 
let me correct that. I'm not sure if you did testify earlier, 
but Don Strong, in fact, was not listed in this case as 
representing Snyderville West; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. What I just testified to aoyidag. is 
that, after he entered his Answer on behalf of many of the 
defendants, I asked him if he knew of the other defendants 
whose entity and identification we did not know. 
Q. And Don Strong replied negatively? 
A. This was not one of the defendants that he had any 
knowledge of. 
Q. Do you have any separate record of that 
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on this document? 
A. I don't see it. 
Q. In fact, is the name of Snyderville West identified 
anywhere in the four pages of this Summons with attached 
service memoranda? 
A. I believe it is. 
Q. Except as listed — 
A. They are listed as one of the defendants. 
Q. — as one of the defendants? 
MR. ORTON: On the first page. 
A. Except as listed as one of the defendants on 
approximately line 20, I don't see that it is. The Summons is 
directed to the above-named defendants. I guess that is a 
reference to anybody up in there. But outside of that, there 
is no specific mention of Snyderville West. 
Q. Okay. And I believe, as you testified earlier, the 
typed notation on the top is: "Please serve upon Jim Gaddis"? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And there is no mention of Snyderville West there? 
A. Not on the top, that's correct. 
Q. Please continue. 
A. I don't know if you have that from before. That is 
from the client. He better review that before you look at it. 
MR. ORTON: That would be privileged. 
MR. WRAY: For the record, I would like to note that 
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through today, that's where I get my knowledge. 
Q, Are you able to specifically remember an envelope 
addressed to Snyderville West? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Are you able to state that an envelope, assuming it 
were mailed to Snyderville West, was never returned to the 
Marsden-Orton law firm? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And what's the basis for that? 
A. That we maintain the file with all of them that came 
back and it is not among them. 
Q. But you're not able to state definitely that such an 
envelope was never returned? 
MR. ORTON: I'll object, I think he could state, 
yes. I think he did state that. 
Q. I recognize it is a difficult area of response 
because you're asked to state to a negative. 
A. Let me state it this way. I can state that all of 
those envelopes which were returned when I was in the employ of 
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist were maintained in this file, and 
none that were returned when I was there were removed from this 
file. 
Q. But you have not had control over this file since you 
left? 
A. I have not had control over this file since I left 
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and I am not aware of any that have been taken out of this file 
since I left. 
Q. But clearly, there wouldn't be any reason for you to 
know one way or the other, since you are not with the law firm? 
A. That's correct. Anything that happened to this file 
between then and now, I do not have knowledge of, 
Q. What areas of law do you specialize in or 
particularly practice in? 
A, Real estate. 
Q. Any other areas? 
A. Oh, I do some commercial litigation, but basically 
real estate. 
Q. Have you participated in any other lawsuits 
attempting to quiet title? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you done so prior to your involvement with this 
lawsuit or at the same time, continuing, recognizing this 
lawsuit continued over several years with your involvement? 
A. I'm not sure we had a quiet title action going at 
that time. I can't recall one. 
Q, Do you recall if you participated in any quiet title 
actions or actions similar to quiet title in which title to 
land was at issue, prior to being involved with this lawsuit? 
A. Before this lawsuit? 
Q. That's correct. 
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investigation. 
A. We called the Department of Motor Vehicles and asked 
for anything in the name of Snyderville West and nothing was 
found. I believe Blake Miller was the one who did the actual 
calling on that. I could be mistaken, but that's what I 
believe. 
Q. Subparagraph C states, in effect, that you found 
only the tax address? 
A. That's correct. I did call the Department of 
Business Corporations here in the state. I also called the 
County Clerk's Office here and in Summit County seeking a 
limited partnership in the name of Snyderville West, and none 
was found. I see the corporate information is set forth on D. 
Q. In what records did you find the tax address? 
A. I didn't find it. Mr. Miller found it. I believe 
it was in the Assessor's Office. 
Q. As to when, your best recollection, as I recall, was 
sometime between May of 1983 and October of 1983? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he make inquiry of the Treasurer's Office? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. How about the Recorder's Office? 
A. I'm sure he did the Recorder's Office. I don't know 
if he did the Treasurer's Office. 
Q. You said a minute ago, you think it was the 
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Assessor's Office where he got that address? 
Yes. 
Q. Why is it that you say you know that he talked to 
the Recorder's Office? 
A. Because he went up to the Recorder's Office at first 
to find out where the plats of land are; and then when we were 
looking for properties, he went back to the Recorder's Office 
to find out if they had any addresses which correlated to those 
properties on which we found names. 
Q. When he first went up to the Recorder's Office, would 
that have been prior to June of 1982? The reason why I pull 
June of 1982 out of the year as a date is that I notice that a 
Title Report, which we'll get to a little later, had <in 
effective date of June of 1982 and a listing of all of the 
property on Parcel No. 6 which is the seven-acre Snyderville 
West property. 
A. He may have. My guess is he did. I'm — I assume we 
could go back and find his time sheets and find that out. 
Q. Did you, at any time, yourself, personally visit the 
Recorder's Office and the Treasurer's Office or the Assessor's 
Office in Summit County in respect to this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell me when and under what circumstances? 
A. I reviewed the file to see what they had received as 
far as Answers and Returns of Service after the Complaint had 
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been filed, and I don't know what date it would have been. It 
was probably — 
Q. That would have been the Clerk's Office? 
A. The Clerk's Office. Oh, you did not include the 
Clerk? 
Q. I guess I included the Recorder's, Treasurer's and 
Assessor's Office. 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You never went to the Recorder's, Treasurer's Office 
or the Assessor's Office? 
A. In Summit County, that's correct. 
MR. ORTON: He, personally, you're talking about? 
MR. WRAY: That's correct. 
Q. Is there anything more you can add, based on whatever 
refreshing of recollection you have had through all this, as to 
the circumstances under which the tax address had been 
determined, the 1253 East 2100 South? 
A. I believe it was just from the records of Summit 
County. 
Q. And you have no separate recollection as to the 
specific property to which that address related? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Subparagraph D — 
A. I already stated — 
Q. — relates to investigation of corporation files? 
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A. Yes, I called both the corporate offices, in both 
Salt Lake and Summit County, to see if there were — seeking 
information as to registered assumed names, and none were 
listed. 
Q. Subparagraph E? 
A. Postal service check. I asked the secretary to see 
if there were forwarding addresses on all of the names, many 
of whom we had no address for, to see if they had a listing 
for any of them. 
Q. Did you believe, at the time between May of 1983 and 
October of 1983, that Snyderville West owned property in Summit 
County by virtue of your knowledge that there was a tax 
address? 
A. I made no such opinion as to whether they owned 
anything. I certainly knew that they claimed an interest in 
certain property that was involved in our litigation. 
Q. And the basis for your knowledge of that claim, 
again, was what? 
A. The Title Report. 
MR. WRAY: Let me turn to a copy of the Title Report 
which I'd like to introduce as Exhibit No. 23. 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 3 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q. This is a document, the original of which Mr. Orton 
has provided at this meeting for copying. It is identified as 
(Examination by Mr. Wray) 62 
a Title Report of Utah Title and Abstract Company, actually 
identified as a Commitment for Title Insurance, addressed to 
Mr. Robert Orton. I ask, Mr. Davis, if you would take a look 
at that and describe that document for me more fully and 
identify it. Is that the Title Report that you referred to a 
minute or two ago? 
A. I don't have an independent recollection if this is 
the only one or one we used. It appears to be a title 
commitment that was sent to Mr. Orton in June of 1982, so it 
stands to reason this is certainly one that we looked at. 
Q. Do you recall ever looking at one such Title Report? 
A. I don't know. I can't recall. 
MR. WRAY: Bob, do you recall if there was another 
Title Report that was prepared at or about that time or in 
connection with the lawsuit? 
MR. ORTON: I don't think we had another one 
prepared. Whether we had access to others from the files, I 
don't know. 
MR. WRAY: In any event, you obviously had access to 
this one. It was addressed to you. 
Q. What is the effective date of that title commitment? 
A. June 10, 1982. 
Q. It is order No. — 
A. — S-5383. 
Q. Would you turn to Exhibit B. That contains a listing 
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of parcels? 
A. It does. 
Q. Would you take a minute to look at that and tell me 
if that is the same listing of parcels as was set forth in the 
Complaint which was attached to Exhibit No. 17? 
A. Nine of the parcels that are listed on this report 
are also listed in the Complaint. There are also two other 
parcels on the Complaint. 
Q. Can you tell me where the legal descriptions for 
parcels No. 10 and 11 on the Complaint would have come from, 
then, since they clearly didn't come from the Title Report? 
A. Other documents which we had found in the search of 
the files of Mr. Major. 
Q. Do you have with you or have you seen today, in the 
files that Mr. Orton provided, copies of those documents that 
were provided with reference to that? 
A. I have not seen those today. 
Q. Do you know what those documents are? 
A. Off the top of my head, no. 
But as to parcels Nos. 1 through 9 of the Summons — 
Deposition Exhibit 17, and also in the Complaint, are the legal 
descriptions the same as in the Title Report? 
A. They appear to be the same. I have not reviewed 
every call and boundary to make sure that they were exactly the 
same, but they appear to be the same. 
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Q. How about Parcel No* 6 in particular? 
A. It appears to be the same as Parcel No. 6 in the 
Title Report. 
Q. You want to take a minute and just confirm that, 
since it is just a paragraph long? 
A. Okay. 
(Discussion off the record) 
MR. WRAY: On the record. 
Q. Is the legal description of Parcel 6 in the Title 
Report which I will, for shorthand reference, probably continue 
to use as a reference to deposition Exhibit 23, and Parcel 
No. 6 of the Summons and Complaint attached as part of 
deposition Exhibit 17 the same? 
A. It is. 
Q. Has your review so far of this Title Report, 
Deposition Exhibit 23, in light of the fact that the effective 
date of June 10, 1982 is indicated on that document, refreshed 
your recollection in any way as to specific details of how the 
legal descriptions of the various parcels were determined, 
other than what you previously testified? Any specific times 
as to when Mr. Miller — 
A. Mr. Miller? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I guess it would have been prior to June 10, 1982. 
Q. It is still your best recollection that the source of 
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those legal descriptions and those individual parcels would 
have been Mr. Miller 's investigation in the Recorder's Office? 
A. Those together with what other documents we found in 
the files of Mr. Major. 
Q. Would you take a minute and leaf through or go 
through Exhibit A to the Title Report, Deposition Exhibit 
No. 23, Exhibit A being described as "The title of the estate 
referred to vested in, see Exhibit A," with respect to seeing 
if the Title Report identifies vesting with respect to Parcel 
No. 6? 
A. Maybe I'm missing it, but I don't see it. Do you? 
Q. I didn't see it, either. 
A. Krofcheck remaining, so I guess it does say that 
J. L. Krofcheck, a/k/a Joseph L. Krofcheck was vested in the 
property remaining in Parcel No. 6. 
Q. Would you take a minute and review Schedule B, 
Section 2, which is identified in the printed part of the form 
as the "Special Exceptions," it is entitled, to determine if 
there is any reference to Snyderville West, Jim Gaddis or 
Gaddis Investments? 
MR. ORTON: You mean any exception to Joseph 
Krofcheck? 
MR. WRAY: Any reference in Schedule B 2 — 
A. That specified any exception to Gaddis or 
Snyderville West? 
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Q. That's correct. 
A. No* 53, which is "Easement and Conditions Contained 
Therein" shows the grantor to be Snyderville West of that 
easement dated March 23, 1981, recorded April 16, 1981. 
Q. What parcel does that effect? 
A. It effects Parcel 6. 
Q. Did you examine that document to determine if there 
was any further information concerning the address of 
Snyderville West? 
A. I can't recall whether I personally examined that 
document or not. 
Q. Do you know if anyone in the Marsden-Orton office 
examined that document? 
A. Well, if I can't remember whether I did or not, I 
would have a hard time telling you that somebody else did. We 
reviewed the documents that were designated here, someone did, 
to try to find who and what was the entity of Snyderville 
West. But I have no independent recollection of that document. 
Q. So, you have no recollection, yourself, of examining 
that document? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You don't know if anybody in the Marsden-Orton firm 
examined that document? 
A. I couldn't tell you who did. 
Q. Or indeed, if anyone did? 
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A. I could not state that someone did. That's correct. 
Q. Please continue. 
A. No. 83 is a "Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated July 13, 1978 and recorded July 14, 1978 wherein 
Snyderville West claims an interest in Parcel 6 by an 
Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract." 
Q. Did you examine — did you, yourself, examine that 
Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract? 
A. I do not have an independent recollection of 
examining that document. 
Q. Would you have made a notation in the files if you 
had done so? 
A. I don't know. I may have. 
Q. Would you ordinarily have, in your search for the 
identity of Snyderville West? 
A. If I had found something that had given me a notice 
of or something that might have helped me to find who and what 
Snyderville West was, then I would have made a notation. 
Q. I draw your attention to the Gaddis Deposition 
Exhibit 5 which is entitled a Notice of Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and is recorded, and the document and Deposition 
Exhibit 5 states it is entry 147707, which is the same number 
as given in paragraph 83 of the Title Report; is that correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And the book and page numbers are the same in the 
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reference in paragraph 83 and in the document, Deposition 
Exhibit 5? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Do you recall having seen that document, that being 
Deposition Exhibit 5? 
A. I don't have an independent recollection of it, but 
it wouldn't surprise me if I had seen it. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Because there were many documents which were signed 
by Robert Major in the files of Investor Associates that I did 
review and look at. 
Q. Was that document signed by Robert Major? 
A. It was. 
Q. But you have no separate and definite remembrance of 
ever having seen that document before? 
A. I don't have independent recollection of this 
document, that's correct. 
Q. You have no records that you have produced today or 
you are aware of that would indicate you have ever seen that 
document? 
A. No, I would have to go back and look in the Investor 
Associates file to see if a copy of that is in that file. If I 
— as I look at this, I don't know I would make any notation 
because it gives no clue as to who Snyderville West is. 
Q. What is the Investor Associates file? 
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Q. As to attorney Don Strong, did you make any such 
inquiry? 
Q. I specifically remember speaking with Don Strong 
about each of these defendants and the problem we were having 
serving them. 
Q. Your testimony was that he had no knowledge of 
Snyderville West? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you, in fact, prepare a Summons for personal 
service for Snyderville West in this case? 
A. Number one, when you say did I, in fact, prepare it, 
I assume you mean did I cause it to be prepared by my 
secretaries. I didn't type out any of the Summonses. 
Q. Did you cause to be? 
A. I'm not sure whether we did for them or not. 
Q. You don't recall? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Why would that have been the case, that you might not 
have? 
A. If we didn't know who to serve, then we may not have 
caused a personal service or personal — or a Complaint 
specifically designated to Snyderville West would have been 
prepared. 
Q. Who, in the office of — 
A. Let me make one backtrack on that. In connection 
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"... caused to be prepared envelopes addressed to the 
defendants..." identified in that Affidavit of Mailing; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. An important issue in this case, for the purpose of 
present proceedings, may be the address on the envelope. Is it 
possible for you to state what address was on that envelope at 
that time when the envelope addressed to Snyderville West was 
sent out? 
A. I don't have an independent recollection of what 
address was on the envelope. 
MR. ORTON: Are you asking him from his own personal 
recollection, or based upon office procedures at the time? 
MR. WRAY: Personal recollection. 
A. I do not have a personal recollection of what was on 
that envelope. 
Q. Do you know if a photocopy or a xerographic copy was 
kept of the face of the envelope to Snyderville West? 
A. I'm certain that one was not. 
Q. That's just because that's not the procedure, 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You state in your affidavit that the address which 
was typed on the envelope was taken from the record referred to 
in paragraph 6 of your affidavit, which shows the address to be 
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1253 East 2100 South. But is it not true that, even though it 
may generally have been the contemplation of all the parties 
that it be the correct address, that it might, in fact, have 
been typed on the envelope as 7100 South instead of 2100 
South? 
MR. ORTON: I object. It calls for speculation on 
the part of the witness. 
Q. Are you able to state with a certainty that the 
envelope, as mailed, had the address of 2100 South rather than 
7100 South? 
A. I cannot state that. 
Q. With respect to your affidavit, paragraph 10, you 
state in here that the first class postage for the envelopes 
delivered to the Summit County Clerk, that the postage was 
affixed to the envelopes when they were delivered for mailing 
to the Summit County Clerk. But earlier, we've seen that, in 
fact, there was a Coalville postmark on there. And I believe 
your testimony was that, in fact, it was probably the County 
Clerk's Office that affixed the postage? 
A. My testimony was, we probably put the Martin Luther 
stamp on and the excess postage was affixed by the Summit 
County Clerk. 
Q. Your statement in paragraph 10 of the affidavit is 
not strictly correct in the sense that all of the necessary 
postage was not put on the envelopes when you delivered the 
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Q. So you have no definite knowledge. You can't state 
with a certainty, based our own personal experience or records 
available to you, that it was mailed out with the correct 
postage? 
A. Based on the records that are available to me, I 
would have to state that there was a Martin Luther twenty-cent 
stamp in the corner and there was another postage seal from 
Coalville, Utah for any remaining postage which may have been 
due on that. 
Q. What we have seen have been the postage stamps 
affixed on the envelopes that were ultimately returned to you. 
But since we never got back and no one ever located the 
envelope addressed to Snyderville West, we have no information 
on that? 
A. That's correct. We haven't got it back and we don't 
have it before us. That's correct. 
Q. I'd like to have you take a look at several of the 
documents in the deposition exhibits and see if you can tell me 
if you have ever seen these documents before. Gaddis 
deposition document No. 2 is a document entitled Memorandum 
Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Real Property. Would 
you look at that document and tell me if you've ever seen that 
document? 
A. I don't have a recollection of this document. I may 
have seen it, but I don't know. 
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Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when 
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate 
summonses may be issued and served. 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the 
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in 
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service 
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may 
be served or appear at any time before trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the names or designations of the parties to the action, the county in 
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which 
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify 
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered 
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by 
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded, 
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall con-
tain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where 
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of 
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days 
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the com-
plaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such 
service. 
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any, 
may be served: 
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is 
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years, 
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate 
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945. 
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States 
marshal or his deputy. 
(3) In a foreign country, either: 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or 
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a 
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a 
managing or general agent; or 
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed 
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or 
(D) as directed by order of the court. 
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a 
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of 
the court. 
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as 
follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a 
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place 
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of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or. 
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a 
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or, 
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care 
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he 
is employed. 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his 
legal guardian. 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized 
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the 
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or 
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent 
having the management, direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the 
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defen-
dant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of 
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person 
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business. 
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the 
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees. 
(6) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to a county commis-
sioner or to the county clerk of such county. 
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board. 
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board. 
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney 
general. 
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing 
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in 
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to 
one of his managers, superintendents or agents. 
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public 
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility oper-
ated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy 
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of 
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any 
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served. 
(0 Other service. 
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is 
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself 
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation hav-
ing no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this 
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are 
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows: 
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order 
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall 
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within 
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each 
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court 
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been 
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain 
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in 
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once 
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is 
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and'complaint to each 
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be 
complete on the day of the last publication. 
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances de-
scribed in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the 
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the 
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely 
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that 
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the 
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his 
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mail-
ing. 
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publi-
cation and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of 
such service. 
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof 
thereof shall be made as follows: 
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of ei-
ther, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service. 
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same state-
ment. 
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his 
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of 
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of 
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as 
prescribed by Subdivision (f) of this rule, if such deposit shall have been 
made. 
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be 
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(h) Amendment At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
(i) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of 
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall 
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
0") Time of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the 
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left 
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title. 
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any pro-
ceeding where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court 
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate 
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
shall be published in the English language. 
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ, 
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers 
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in 
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such 
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or 
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if 
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as 
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same 
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy 
were the original. The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in 
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be 
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The 
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of 
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or 
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the 
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the 
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the 
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L.S.," or by the word "Seal." 
(m) Service by constable. All writs and process, including executions 
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or 
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county. 
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.) 
Amendment Note9. — The 1988 amend-
ment added Subdivision (e)(12). 
Compiler 's Notes. — This rule generally 
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P. 
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision 
(d)(1), appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions 
by collection agencies. 
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the 
"president or clerk of the board of trustees" of 
an incorporated town seems incorrect. Accord-
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and ft-3-106, the governing 
body of an incorporated town consists of a 
council and mayor. 
Cross-References. — Collection agencies, 
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8. 
Condominium association or ownership, ser-
vice of process on person designated in declara-
tion, § 57-8-33. 
Constable, service of process by, §§ 17-22-25, 
17-25-1. 
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nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in 
which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may be sued by common name. When two or more per-
sons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership 
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a com-
mon name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the 
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon 
their joint liability. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and 
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superinten-
dent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising 
out of the conduct of said business. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 17, F.R.C.R 
ANALYSIS 
Associates. 
—Joint venture. 
—Partnership. 
—Unincorporated association. 
Infants. 
—Action for injury of minor. 
Suit by mother. 
—Control by court. 
—Failure to comply. 
Relief from judgment. 
Nonresident doing business in state. 
—Not found. 
Real party in interest. 
—Assignee. 
—Corporation. 
Assignment of assets to another corpora-
tion. 
Foreign corporation. 
Shareholder. 
—Insurance company. 
—Joint tort-feasors. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Purpose of rule. 
—Wife. 
Cited. 
Associates. 
—Joint venture. 
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the 
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5-
101 et seq. 
Service of process, Rule 4. 
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 95 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1988). 
—Partnership. 
Subdivision (d) does not affirmatively allow 
a partnership to bring suit in its common 
name, but the absence of a provision specifi-
cally authorizing a lawsuit in the partnership 
name is not indicative of an intent to prohibit 
such a suit. Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil 
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987). 
—Unincorporated association. 
Subdivision (d) does not authorize an unin-
corporated association to institute an action in 
its common name. Disabled Am. Veterans v. 
Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 
(1959). 
Infants. 
—Action for injury of minor. 
Suit by mother. 
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem 
for benefit of father could bring action for inju-
ries to sixteen-year-old son where father, an 
immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of En-
glish and business matters were mainly han-
dled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for 
suit by father was not exclusive remedy. 
Skoliingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 
P.2d 1177 (1971). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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fcule 10. Form of pleadings . 
f (a) Caption; names of parties. Every pleading 
lhail contain a caption setting forth the name of the 
jourt, the title of the action, the file number, and a 
lesignation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title 
jf the action shall include the names of all the par-
ies, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the 
lame of the first party on each side with an appropri-
ate indication of other parties. A party whose name is 
iot known shall be designated by any name and the 
irords "whose true name is unknown." In an action in 
rem unknown parties shall be designated as "all un-
blown persons who claim any interest in the subject-
natter of this action.'* 
&{b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All aver-
ments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered 
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single 
set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be re-
ferred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each 
jlaim founded upon a separate transaction or occur-
rence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a sep-
aration facilitates the clear presentation of the mat-
ters set forth. 
fac(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements 
in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a differ-
ent part of the same pleading or in another pleading, 
Mr in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part 
thereof for all purposes. 
ft (d) Paper used for pleadings; size and style. All 
pleadings and other papers filed in any action, except 
printed documents or other similar exhibits, shall be 
typewritten on good, white, unglazed paper of letter 
Bize (8V2" x 11"), with a margin at the top of each page 
bf not less than 2 inches and a left hand margin of not 
less than 1 inch. The impression must be on one side 
of the paper only and must be double spaced, except 
for matter customarily single spaced and indented. 
[The number of the action shall be inserted on the first 
page of every pleading or other paper filed, and the 
matter appearing on all pleadings or other papers 
Shall be clearly legible. 
$ The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings 
and" other papers filed and may require counsel to 
Substitute for any pleadings or other papers not con-
forming to the foregoing requirements, original 
pleadings or other papers prepared in conformity 
frtith this subdivision. 
W (e) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an 
Jnginal pleading or paper filed in any action or pro-
seeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
yithout notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed 
tod used in lieu of the original. 
tvAmended, effective Jan. 1, 1983.) 
n* * 
*ule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and 
*&iv other papers; sanctions. 
>Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
"presented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
* attorney of record in his individual name who is 
ftiy licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The 
Attorney's address also shall be stated. A party who is 
S6* represented by an attorney shall sign his plead-
W» motion, or other paper and state his address. Ex-
ij*Pt when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
ij^-jrte, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
;*W b y affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
r{??&t3 °f an answer under oath must be overcome by 
rff? testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sus-
w 1 1 ^ by corroborating circumstanc iffW, c rr r ti  circ st ces is abolished. 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the pleader or mov-
ant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his 
answer within 20 days after the service of the sum-
mons is complete unless otherwise expressly provided 
by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve 
an answer thereto within 20 days afler the service 
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after ser-
vice of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the 
court, within 20 days afler service of the order, unless 
the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion 
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones 
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more defi-
nite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within 10 days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, 
to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of ju-
risdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) in-
sufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall 
be made before pleading if a further pleading is per-
mitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections 
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading afler the denial of such motion or objection. 
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in 
law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for fail-
ure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
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shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After 
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not 
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment 
on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifi-
cally enumerated (1) — (7) in Subdivision (b) of this 
rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and 
the motion for judgment mentioned in Subdivision (c) 
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial 
on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be de-
ferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted 
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reason-
ably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he 
may move for a more definite statement before inter-
posing his responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the 
court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the 
order or within such other time as the court may fix, 
the court may strike the pleading to which the motion 
was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party 
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within 20 days after the service of 
the pleading upon him, the court may order stricken 
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any re-
dundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 
matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who 
makes a motion under this rule may join with it the 
other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and 
does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a mo-
tion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in Subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all de-
fenses and objections which he does not present either 
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the 
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indis-
pensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, 
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by sugges-
tion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dis-
miss the action. The objection or defense, if made at 
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing 
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any mo-
tion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
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party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in 
the event the appellate court concludes that the trial 
court erred in denying the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict If the appellate court re-
verses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it 
from determining that the respondent is entitled to a 
new trial, or from directing the trial court to deter-
mine whether a new tnal shall be granted 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests The court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the re-
quests prior to instructing the jury, and it shall fur-
nish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, 
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally or otherwise waive this require-
ment If the instructions are to be given in writing, 
all objections thereto must be made before the in-
structions are given to the jury, otherwise, objections 
may be made to the instructions after they are given 
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection Notwith-
standing the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, 
may review the giving of or failure to give an instruc-
tion Opportunity shall be given to make objections, 
and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury The court 
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if 
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct 
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact 
(Amended, effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Rule 52. Findings by the cou r t 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A, in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided m Rule 4Kb) The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground 
(b) Amendmen t Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly The mo 
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur 
suant to Rule 59 When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find 
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment or a 
motion for a new trial 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial, 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987) 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court 
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor 
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule As used in these rules the word "master in 
eludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct The master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation but 
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al 
lowed by the court does not pay it after notice and 
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is 
entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent 
party 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the 
exception and not the rule In actions to be tried by i 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues 
are complicated, in actions to be tried without a jury 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 
requires it 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence onlv 
and may fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master s 
report Subject to the specifications and limitations 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear 
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea 
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor 
mance of his duties under the order He may require 
the production before him of evidence upon all mat 
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc 
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, an 
writings applicable thereto He may rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by 
the order of reference and has the authority to Pu 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine the 
and may call the parties to the action and examw 
them upon oath When a party so requests, the mas 
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered an 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the sam 
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ldgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
he docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
xtent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
e a hen In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
ton shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
xecution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
uch partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
:>llect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
le judgment debtors remaining liable thereon 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
ounties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
ave been entered on the judgment docket of the 
>unty where such judgment was first docketed, a 
srtified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
le clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
le clerk of the district court in any other county 
here the judgment may have been docketed There-
pon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
lade by the clerk of such court, and such entry shall 
ave the same effect as in the county where the same 
as originally entered 
ule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
new tnal may be granted to all or any of the parties 
id on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
tg causes, provided, however, that on a motion for a 
ew trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
iay open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
iditional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
usions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
id direct the entry of a new judgment 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
lall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the apphca-
MI for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit 
Tienever a motion for a new tnal is based upon affi-
ivits they shall be served with the motion The op-
>smg party has 10 days after such service within 
hich to serve opposing affidavits The time within 
hich the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
rved may be extended for an additional period not 
needing 20 days either by the court for good cause 
lown or by the parties by written stipulation The 
urt may permit reply affidavits 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days 
ter entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new tnal on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clencal mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein ansmg from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surpnse, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new tnal under 
Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extnnsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons m an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application, or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new tnal or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial nghts of the parties 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the secunty of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs 
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(1) When a public officer is a party to an ap-
peal or other proceeding in the court in an official 
capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or 
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does 
not abate and the officer's successor is automati-
cally substituted as a party. Proceedings follow-
ing the substitution shall be in the name of the 
substituted party, but any misnomer not affect-
ing the substantial rights of the parties shall be 
disregarded. An order of substitution may be en-
tered at any time, but the omission to enter such 
an order shall not affect the substitution. 
(2) When a public officer is a party to an ap-
peal or other proceeding in an official capacity, 
that party may be described as a party by official 
title rather than by name, but the court may re-
quire the officer's name to be added. 
Rule 39. Duties of the clerk. 
(a) General provisions. The office of the clerk, 
with the clerk or a deputy in attendance, shall be 
open during business hours on all days except Satur-
days, Sundays, and legal holidays. 
(b) The docket; calendar; other records re-
quired. The clerk shall keep a record, known as the 
docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the 
court and shall enter therein each case. The number 
of each case shall be noted on the page of the docket 
whereon the first entry is made. All papers filed with 
the clerk and all process, orders, and opinions shall be 
entered chronologically in the docket on the pages 
assigned to the case. Entries shall be brief but shall 
show the nature of each paper filed or decision or 
order entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall 
keep a suitable index of cases contained in the docket. 
The clerk shall keep a minute book in which shall 
be entered a record of the daily proceedings of the 
court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of 
the presiding judge, a calendar of cases awaiting ar-
gument. In placing cases on the calendar for argu-
ment, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in 
criminal cases and to appeals and other proceedings 
entitled to preference by law. 
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry 
of an order or a decision, the clerk shall serve a notice 
of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, 
together with a copy of any opinion respecting the 
order or decision, and shall make a note in the docket 
of the mailing. Service on a party represented by 
counsel shall be made upon counsel. 
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk 
shall have custody of the records and papers of the 
court. The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be taken from the clerk's custody, except 
as authorized by these rules or the orders or instruc-
tions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the 
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of 
the case be returned to the court or agency from 
which they were received. The clerk shall preserve 
copies of briefs and attachments, as well as other 
printed papers filed. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanc-
*— tions and discipline. 
)(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every mo-
tion, brief, and other paper of a party represented by 
£tt attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
Record who is an active member in good standing of 
foe bar of the Supreme Court of Utah. The attorney 
shall sign his or her individual name and give his or 
her business address. A party who is not represented 
by an attorney shall sign every motion, brief, and 
other paper and state the party's address. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat-
ute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be veri-
fied or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an 
attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or the party has read the motion, brief, or 
other paper; that to the best of the attorney's or the 
party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed af-
ter reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary de-
lay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required 
by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention 
of the attorney or the party. If a motion, brief, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the 
court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall impose upon 
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both 
an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal 
or affirmance of the appeal, sanctions and discipline 
under Paragraph (b) of this rule, or an order to pay to 
the other party or parties the amount of the reason-
able expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
motion, brief, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney fee. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and 
parties. The court may, after reasonable notice and 
an opportunity to show cause to the contrary and 
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action 
against any attorney or person who practices before it 
for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or a 
person allowed to appear before the court or for fail-
ure to comply with these rules of the court or order of 
the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a member 
of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee of the state bar for pro-
ceedings in accordance with the Rules of Discipline of 
the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This 
rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the 
court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An at-
torney who is licensed to practice before the bar of a 
sister state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Utah may 
appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such attorney 
shall be associated with an active member in good 
standing of the bar of this court and shall be subject 
to the provisions of this rule and all other provisions 
of these rules. 
JUVENILE COURT RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
SECTION I. COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. 
RULE 
1. Definitions. 
2. Reception of referral/preliminary inquiry. 
3. Intake procedure. 
4. Informal (non-judicial) adjustment procedure. 
5. Contents of petition. 
6. Responsive pleadings or motions. 
SECTION II. CERTIFICATION TO DISTRICT 
COURT. 
7. Certification to district court for criminal pro-
ceedings. 
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While no general rule can be formulated upon this question as to writs 
emanating from courts of record, the same is not true as to justices' courts, 
since their jurisdiction is purely a creature of statute, and limited thereby, so 
that failure of a summons issued by a justice of the peace to comply strictly 
with statutory requirements as to appearance or return day generally prevents 
the justice from acquiring jurisdiction, and renders void all subsequent pro-
ceedings in the action.5 
§16. Designation and names of parties. 
Parties to an action should be designated and described by their proper 
names; in particular, the defendant must be sued in his true name, if known 
or ascertainable by the plaintiff, or in the name which he has assumed or by 
which he is generally known,8 and the summons directed to the defendant, 
notifying him of the action, should properly contain the names of the parties 
thereto. Under many practice provisions, in addition to the names of the 
parties the summons must state the name and address of the plaintiff's attor-
ney, if any, otherwise the plaintiff's address.7 
The process must show the party for whose benefit the action or proceeding 
has been instituted8 and the party who is to be served,9 and it should in all 
cases state the correct Christian name and surname of both.10 The correct 
naming of the defendants is generally a mandatory requirement.11 A sum-
mons which names only one of several, followed by the words "et al.," is not 
sufficient.12 Where, however, the names of the defendants are stated in the 
title of the case in the summons, it is not necessary to repeat them.13 
Where the true name of a defendant is unknown when suit is instituted, it 
is not improper to bring suit against him in the name of John Doe, and, when 
that the omission from the statutory form of For states adopting rules similar to the 
summons which the statute requires to be federal rules, see AM JUR 2d DESK BOOK, 
substantially complied with of the words Document 128. 
"exclusive of the day of service," when desig- practice Aid,._Caption to summons. 16 
nat.ng the tunc for answer, does not render
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the summons void where the statute itself ex-
 t,~ 9^9 . i£ oio 
pressly excludes the first day in the computa- 1 0 : * u * e t seq-> l t > :^ i y-
tion of time). 8. McFadden v Mid-States Mfg. Corp. 175 
Annotation: 6 ALR 841, 849 et seq., s. Kan 240, 262 P2d 838; Hammond v Lewiston, 
97 ALR 746, 751. A. & W. Street R. Co. 106 Me 209, 76 A 672. 
5. Rice v American Nat. Bank, 3 Colo App , 9 ' E x f f c t ? e a ! i ? r a ' r 6 ^ i ^ f c ^ t n " 81, 31 P 1024 (summons returnable upon a Jen ^Mi^-States Mfg. Corp. 175 Kan 240, 
day antedating its issuance held to confer no 
jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace); 10. Walker Fertilizer Co. v Race, 123 Fla 
Davis v D. M. Osborn & Co. 156 Ind 86, 84, 166 So 283, 105 ALR 341. 
59 NE 279 (justice's court held to acquire no As to effect of misnomer, see § 18, infra. 
jurisdiction where summons was made return- ' = 
able in less than the time fixed by statute); 11. Lyman v Milton, 44 Cal 630; McFadden 
Pantall v Dickey, 123 Pa 431, 16 A 789 v ^id-States Mfg. Corp. 175 Kan 240, 262 
(ruling that a justice acquired no jurisdiction P2d 8S»; WasKington County v Gaines, 221 
by a summons returnable in a greater number ™*~* *Mt ^" SE2d 377. 
of days after its date than specified by statute); However, the fact that a bill is filed against 
Leonosio v Bartilino, 7 SD 93, 63 NW 543 a person in a representative capacity, although 
(no jurisdiction acquired by a justice under process is against him as an individual, is 
a summons returnable on a general election not a fatal defect, but may be ignored as 
day). immaterial. Lambert v Huff, A. & T. Co. 82 
Annotation: 6 ALR 841, 851 et seq., s. 97 W V a 3 6 2 > 9 5 *E 1031, 1 ALR 650. 
ALR 746, 752 et seq. 12. Lyman v Milton, 44 Cal 630; Neff v 
a c «;o A T OA D fin; Tribune Printing Co. 421 Pa 122, 218 A2d 
6. See 59 Am Jur 2d, PARTIES § 15. 755 
7. See Rule 4(b), Fed Rules oi Civ Proc. 13. Martin v Parker, 14 Minn 13, Gil 1. 
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service is made, to have the sheriff add the true name after an alias. In such 
cases it is not necessary to prove that John Doe is the same person as the 
defendant actually served if the latter by making no appearance or defense 
admits by such inaction that he was the person intended to be sued.14 Gen-
erally, of course, unknown persons must be served by publication.15 
A warrant is sufficient to hold stockholders in a foreign corporation not 
authorized to do business in the state liable as partners which describes them as 
stockholders in a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in the 
state, and summons them to answer an action on account for labor rendered.18 
§17. —Similarity of names; evidence to show identity. 
Sometimes there are two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the court 
and the reach of its process bearing the same name, and the one served there-
with is not the one intended to be sued. It has been stated that if a person 
bearing the same name as the defendant is served with process and judgment 
is entered against him, he cannot avoid its effect by proving that he was not 
the person intended to be sued or served;17 but the better rule appears to be 
that parol evidence is admissible to show the identity or nonidentity of parties.18 
An identity of names may constitute prima facie proof of identity of person,19 
but where the person against whom a judgment is sought to be enforced and 
the true defendant bear different names, they are presumed to be different 
persons, although this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the former 
is the person who was served with process in the action.20 
§ 18. — Misnomer; effect of incorrect name where party has been served. 
While the summons or other process should state correctly the name of 
the parties to the action and particularly the name of the person to be served, 
a mistake in the defendant's name—a misnomer—is not necessarily a fatal 
defect,1 but generally is considered to be a defect which may be amended,2 
and it may even be disregarded where it is fairly certain that no prejudice has 
resulted to the defendant.3 
As a general rule, an objection that the defendant was sued by the wrong 
name is matter of abatement only, and will not avoid a judgment against him 
14. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Ramirez, 99 Ariz 
372, 409 P2d 292 (recognizing rule, but 
pointing out that the true name was not in-
serted after an alias in the instant case, and 
saying that it is not enough merely to serve 
a person with process unless it is made known 
to him that he is a defendant and is being 
served in the place of one of the fictitious 
persons); Curtis v Herrick, 14 Cal 117. 
15. § 84, infra. 
16. Cunnyngham v Shelby, 136 Tenn 176, 
188 SW 1147. 
17. Brum v Ivins, 154 Cal 17, 96 P 876. 
18. Thornily v Prentice, 121 Iowa 89, 96 
NW 728; Keene v Wilkerson, 45 Tenn App 
455, 325 SW2d 286. 
19. Ritchie v Carpenter, 2 Wash 512, 28 P 
380. 
20. Brum v Ivins, 154 Cal 17, 96 P 876. 
1. Guzman v Montgomery Ward & Co. 9 
Ariz App 186, 450 P2d 427; Modist v 
Lynch, 277 Mass 135, 177 NE 861; Clevenger 
v Grover, 212 NC 13, 193 SE 12, 124 ALR 
82; O. K. Butler Const. Co. v Bentley, 205 
Okla 225, 237 P2d 886; Fuel City Mfg. Co. 
v Waynesburg Products Corp. 268 Pa 441, 
112 A 145. 
Annotation: 124 ALR 86 et seq. 
As to misnomer or misdescription of parties 
generally, see 59 Am Jur 2d, PARTIES §§ 257, 
258. 
2. See § 24, infra. 
3 . A trial court is warranted in overruling 
objections to purely formal changes in the 
designation or names of parties where it is 
clear that no prejudice can result to the de-
fendant. Walker Fertilizer Co. v Race, 123 
Fla 84, 166 So 283, 105 ALR 341. 
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appear that such agent was authorized to bind his principal by the acceptance 
of process.1 Authority of an agent to bind his principal by acceptance of 
service of process may be implied by law from the ostensible relationship be-
tween the parties,2 although an attorney does not, merely by virtue of a general 
employment, have authority to accept service of process in behalf of his client 
and bind him thereby.3 
§ 30. Effect of defective service or loss of process. 
Generally, service of process must be substantially in accordance with the 
requirements of the law; if service is insufficient and unauthorized by law, 
the court does not acquire jurisdiction and the judgment rendered is without 
validity, force, or effect.4 This is true where notice is served on the wrong 
person, although of the same name as the defendant,6 even if the party served, 
on discovering the mistake, mails to the defendant the copy of the summons 
served upon him, with a letter explaining the matter.6 On the other hand, 
actual service may be made even where the service is defective.7 
The subsequent loss or destruction of a valid writ or summons after its 
service upon the defendant—after it has fulfilled its function of giving the 
defendant notice of the proceeding against him and an opportunity to appear 
and defend—does not affect the plaintiff's action or defeat rights which have 
been declared under such process or summons, provided its existence and the 
acts done under it can be substantiated.8 It has been said to be a matter resting 
in the discretion of the court, upon ascertaining the defective state of the 
record, to supply the deficiency.9 Oral proof may be received at a subsequent 
term showing the loss and the nature of the sheriff's return, for the purpose 
of upholding a judgment.10 In many jurisdictions the statutes and rules of 
practice contain express provisions governing the procedure to be followed 
when process or a return has been lost or detroyed, usually providing for the 
substitution of a copy or a substantial copy thereof, and in proper cases an 
alias writ may doubtless be issued.11 
1. Lower v Wilson, 9 SD 252, 68 NW 545. 
As to service of process upon an agent 
or attorney of a party, §§ 46, 47, infra. 
2. Bass v American Products Export & Im-
port Corp. 124 SC 346, 117 SE 594, 30 ALR 
168. 
Annotation: 30 ALR 176. 
Authority on the part of a clerk of an 
attorney to accept service of summons in an 
action in which the attorney is a party de-
fendant is not to be implied merely from the 
fact that such clerk had authority to accept 
service of papers in cases wherein the at-
torney had been employed professionally. 
Lower v Wilson, 9 SD 252, 68 NW 545. 
3. See 7 Am Jur 2d, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
i 117. 
4. Nelson v Chittenden, 53 Colo 30, 123 
P 656; Parkhurst v White, 254 Iowa 477, 118 
NW2d 47; Laney v Garbee, 105 Mo 355, 16 
SW 831; Sanford v Edwards, 19 Mont 56, 47 
P 212; Durham Fertilizer Co. v Marshburn, 
1 2 2 N C 4 1 1 , 2 9 S E 4 1 1 . 
See Restatement, JUDGMENTS § 8, Comment 
5. Flowers v King, 145 NC 234, 58 SE 1074. 
6. Schneitman v Noble, 75 Iowa 120, 39 
NW 224; Savings Bank v Authier, 52 Minn 
98, 53 NW 812. 
7. National Metal Co. v Greene Consol. 
Copper Co. 11 Ariz 108, 89 P 535; Quarl 
v Abbett, 102 Ind 233, 1 NE 476. 
8.' Mussina v Cavazos, 6 Wall (US) 355, 18 
L Ed 810; York & C. R. Co. v Myers, 18 
How (US) 246, 15 L Ed 380; Klosenski v 
Flaherty (Fla) 116 So 2d 767, 82 ALR2d 664, 
conformed to (Fla App) 117 So 2d 7. 
Generally as to lost or destroyed judicial 
records and the restoration thereof, see 52 Am 
Jur 2d, LOST AND DESTROYED INSTRUMENTS 
§§ 31 et seq. 
9. York & C. R. Co. v Myers, 18 How (US) 
246, 15 L Ed 380. 
10. Gentry v Hutchcraft, 7 TB Mon (Ky) 
241. 
11. Practice Aids.—Alias summons. 16 
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